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5Introduction
The Arab-Swahili and the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor in the Nineteenth Century
East-Central Africa in the nineteenth-century was a region riven with internal discord,
which was accentuated by intrusive foreign groups that prolonged and worsened the
violence and rivalries that punctuated everyday life. The Arab-Swahili of Africas east
coast were one of the most prominent of these groups and acted primarily as traders
and merchants, seeking to export the commodities of the African interior, such as
ivory and slaves, to the markets of the world.
This thesis will examine the Arab-Swahili traders and their activities in a specific
region of the East-Central African interior, namely the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor.
This region of elevated, marshy land is situated between lakes Tanganyika and
Mweru and represents one of the first places where the Arab-Swahili directly entered
African political life, dominating the land themselves as political elites, rather than
simply trading with the pre-existing African authorities. Mweru-Tanganyika is
amongst the best places in Central Africa to explore the impact of coastal activities
upon the indigenous peoples of Africa, with the Arab-Swahili exploiting both internal
political divisions and the abundant natural resources.
In many ways the Corridor was exactly as its name suggests; a route between
various chiefdoms, polities, ethnic groups, and spheres of control, used, and abused,
by almost every resident group and external intruder. It was the site of continuous
interaction between several different parties during the nineteenth-century, including:
Central African chiefdoms and polities; coastal traders and their roving bands of
ruga-ruga mercenaries; and Europeans, including both early explorers and
missionary groups, and later colonial representatives of the British, Germans and
Belgian-owned Congo Free State.
The focus of this work is the Arab-Swahili traders; the items and commodities they
traded; their methods of military, political and economic control; and their
6relationships with both the African peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika and the Europeans
who began to enter the region in the nineteenth-century.
The importance of studying the activities of the Arab-Swahili in this region during the
nineteenth-century cannot be understated. The introduction of the long-distance
trade opened up East-Central Africa and Mweru-Tanganyika to the global markets,
and irrevocably altered life for the peoples of the region. Prior to the Arab-Swahili
penetration, the majority of people in the region had barely ventured beyond their
immediate locales and had only limited knowledge of their neighbours, unless there
was particularly extensive contact between the two through raiding or regional trade
networks.
With their entrance into the global economy, the peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika
developed from what was effectively a feudal hierarchical society of subsistence
agriculture to one of wage labour in an industrialising colonial system of mining and
commercial farming. Therefore, the Arab-Swahili can be credited as the people that
introduced the modern world to East-Central Africa, despite their often violent and
abhorrent methods.
This thesis will bring together what is at present a rather scattered and disparate
literature on the topic. A definitive study of the Arab-Swahili in and around Mweru-
Tanganyika has yet to be produced and this thesis will redress this scholarly gap and
pull together the existing material on the subject into one single work. Separately, the
existing primary and secondary sources present an incomplete picture. However,
taken together they can be used to fully uncover the actions and events surrounding
the rise to dominance of the coastal traders in Mweru-Tanganyika and their
inevitable fall from grace at the hands of the European colonial administrations.
The central argument of this thesis will be the importance of the changing approach
of the Arab-Swahili in East-Central Africa. As will be discussed in greater detail later
in this thesis, the number Arab-Swahili traders in the African interior increased
greatly over time, as did their influence on the African peoples they interacted with.
With their increase in number and importance in Mweru-Tanganyika and the
surrounding regions, the coastal traders changed their approach from one of
peaceful and considered interaction with the African chiefs they encountered to one
7of more overtly political and violent methods that ultimately led to their dominance in
the region.
Whilst this change of strategy has been noted and explored by several historical
works, what the authors have only partially conveyed is the fundamental effect that
the tactical shift had, not only on the Arab-Swahili, but more importantly on the
peoples of the Mweru-Corridor. This thesis will describe the methodological shift of
the coastal traders, building on the foundation of past works to explain the effect this
had on the Central African polities that interacted with the Arab-Swahili.
The socio-economic and political effects of the Arab-Swahilis increasingly
developing interventionist policy in the middle decades of the nineteenth century
were of vital importance. The arrival of the coastal traders brought unprecedented
availability of trade goods for local chiefs and village headmen, which acted to
remove their reliance on the distributive systems that supplied them with these same
trade goods from their kings and paramounts. With their vassals no longer reliant
upon them and their mercantile monopolies broken by the Arab-Swahili, the
paramount chiefs of the polities of the Mweru-Tanganyika region found themselves
increasingly weakened, to the point where the Arab-Swahili presented a very real
threat and could forcibly remove opposing chiefs and install their rivals, who were
more amenable to the demands of the coastal traders.
This leads on to the second major argument of this thesis, the importance of internal
discord and violence amongst the African peoples of the region in assisting the
eventual domination of the Arab-Swahili. This argument will combat the view held by
many historians that the most influential reason for the success of intrusive groups in
East-Central Africa, be they Arab-Swahili or European, was their military and
economic superiority over the inhabitants of the African continent. It will be argued
below that if the Arab-Swahili had encountered African polities with strong,
centralised governments and paramounts able to maintain their commercial
monopolies within their kingdoms, then the coastal traders would have had a far
harder time gaining political control of the region.
What the Arab-Swahili in fact found were divided polities under weakened rulers with
many rivals that the traders could force into power effectively as their puppets. These
new paramount chiefs were then entirely beholden to the Arab-Swahili for their
8power and unable to establish their own dominance at the risk of finding themselves
replaced by yet another willing Arab-Swahili-backed pretender.
This change in behaviour amongst the African political elites, brought about by the
intervention of the Arab-Swahili, proves the importance of internal division in allowing
the coastal traders to become the dominant power in Mweru-Tanganyika before the
arrival of the European colonialists in the final decades of the 1800s. Whilst having
access to firearms and vast supplies of trade goods did undoubtedly assist the Arab-
Swahili in their success in the region, they were still a tiny minority when compared
to the numbers of the peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor. Without support
from the divided African ruling classes and chiefs willing to trade with them, the Arab-
Swahili would never have been able to alter their doctrine and become politically
involved in the regions they were trading in. They would have remained a peripheral
influence as they were with the Bemba polity, which had both strong leadership and
effective and numerous military resources.
This thesis aims to encourage further study of this region of the African continent
and, more particularly, its pre-colonial history. African history as a discipline may only
be half a century old, but in the twenty-first-century very little scholarly attention is
being paid to the pre-colonial history of the continent, whilst the ever-popular
histories of colonialism and the slave trade remain well catered for. This is potentially
a result of the lack of primary sources available for the pre-colonial era, due to the
non-literate African cultures that predominate in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of
the written evidence that does exist is either early European first-hand accounts or,
in some very rare cases, the memoirs and histories of intrusive groups, such as the
Arab-Swahili traders. This makes original pre-colonial scholarship and research
more difficult and reliant upon extensive fieldwork and oral histories if it wishes to be
original in its subject matter.
That is not to say that these later histories of Africa are any less important than pre-
colonial history, but all that is needed to see the obvious dearth of recent pre-colonial
academic scholarship is to examine the bibliography of this very thesis. The bulk of
the historical research contained therein is over forty years old and there is
undeniably space in the historiography for a new generation of pre-colonial African
historians to emerge. This thesis seeks to assist in this process and attract academic
9attention to the pre-colonial history of this region of the continent, encouraging
historians to reassess the existing scholarly research and reopen the pre-colonial
African historical debate.
In approaching this thesis, it has been deemed necessary to subdivide Arab-Swahili
activities in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor into four distinct, roughly chronological
chapters. The first chapter aims to produce a definitive and accurate early history of
coastal traders and their involvement in the Corridor and surrounding areas. This
chapter will roughly cover the period between 1800 and 1880, beginning with the
origins of Arab-Swahili involvement in the African interior and ending with their
golden age of domination under the infamous trader Tippu Tip and his el-Murjebi
clan associates.
Particular emphasis will be placed on the changing Arab-Swahili attitude towards
involvement in internal African politics. Early coastal traders were relatively weak and
were only able to operate in the interior with the blessing of the various African kings
and chiefs of the region. However, Tippu Tip and his colleagues introduced a new
pattern of activity for coastal traders, based upon the threat of, and willingness to
use, violence to further their economic ends. Also central to this modus operandi was
a new readiness for direct involvement in the politics of the African peoples of
Mweru-Tanganyika, playing rival chiefs off against one another, whilst acting as
mercenaries for their favoured candidates as long as the new chief proved amenable
to their commercial demands and interests.
Having sketched the basic contours of Arab-Swahili history in the Mweru-Tanganyika
corridor, the second chapter will focus more specifically on the economics of the
Arab-Swahili long-distance trade in slaves, ivory and other commodities. The Arab-
Swahili were drawn into the interior of East-Central Africa by the promise of a ready
supply of in-demand commodities that they could export to the coast as middlemen.
A significant part of this chapter will be an examination of the development of pre-
existing regional networks of exchange into the long-distance trade routes of the
Arab-Swahili, and the societal effects of the trade upon the peoples along the routes.
An example of this development of trade between African peoples and passing Arab-
Swahili can be seen in the caravans need for extensive resupplying, which provided
a perfect market for foodstuffs and other essentials produced by local peoples.
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Chapter 2 will also examine the commodities involved in the Arab-Swahili long-
distance trade. It will initially discuss the main commercial items of the trade, ivory
and slaves, before moving on to survey the natural resources of Mweru-Tanganyika
also involved in commerce, such as iron, salt and copper. Having looked at the main
exports of the trade, Chapter 2 will then discuss the trade goods imported by the
Arab-Swahili into the African interior. Items such as cloth and beads were used in
exchange for the desired commodities mentioned above.
Chapter 3 will explore the violence inherent in the Corridor throughout the
nineteenth-century and how the patterns of that violence changed with the arrival of
the Arab-Swahili. A major consideration in this chapter will be the impact of firearms
on the interior, not just as weapons but as items of trade and exchange. A debate
exists over the true impact and power of firearms in the hands of the Arab-Swahili in
this period and this chapter will engage with that. The chapter ends with a discussion
of Richard Reids theory of military revolution and its possible applicability to
Mweru-Tanganyika in the age of the long-distance trade.
The final chapter will then conclude the chronological examination of coastal trader
activities in the African interior with an exploration of the last twenty years of the
nineteenth-century and the interactions between the entrenched Arab-Swahili traders
and the newly established European colonial administrations. This will be examined
through the prism of two main case studies: Abdullah ibn Suliman and Nshimba of
Kilwa Island. The analysis of the relationships between these two individuals and
their followers and British and C.F.S. officials will bring the history of the Arab-Swahili
to a close with their eventual fall from power and expulsion from Mweru-Tanganyika
Ethnography
This thesis deals with the interaction between various social groups in the African
interior. Because of this, a brief introductory ethnographical description is most
useful in order to better understand some of the events and dynamics that transpired
in nineteenth-century Mweru-Tanganyika.
Drawing on missionary reports, Echoes of Service, the journal of the Plymouth
Brethren, described the Arab-Swahili traders in the following terms: they were called
Arabs, or, by the Africans, Va-Lungwana, but they are a mongrel race, and not true
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Arabs. They are however strict Mohammedans.1 This assessment, whilst blatantly
tinged by racism and the personal aversion of the Plymouth Brethren missionaries to
the coastal traders, does contain at least a grain of truth: the Arab-Swahili were a
very heterogeneous group. From their name, it is easy to assume that the Arab-
Swahili took the form of the stereotypical Arab trader, Middle-Eastern in appearance
and Islamic in dress and culture. However, this assumption is largely untrue. As
Peter Lary and Marcia Wright write, Arab-Swahili is more of an umbrella term
referring to Swahili speakers originating from the Coast of modern-day Tanzania and
the East African islands of Zanzibar, Kilwa and Pemba. In strictly racial terms, many
of them would have been all but indistinguishable from the African peoples of the
interior.2
As a result of their Islamic faith and the customs surrounding the institution of
slavery, the Arab-Swahili were an incorporative group. Slaves, no matter their origin,
would be introduced to the Swahili culture and Islam upon their arrival at Zanzibar or
the Swahili coast.3 Islamic law demanded that slaves be treated well and the faith of
Islam was central to the absorption of people. There were no racial biases and all
were embraced if they would adopt the Swahili culture, learning the language,
dressing and living as a Swahili and converting to Islam.4 In this respect, the Swahili
coast was remarkably meritocratic, with success, wealth and increased prestige
awaiting those who worked hard, free or unfree and independent of their origins.5
This was equally true of those who joined trading caravans venturing west into the
African interior, with little heed being paid to ones race or origins as they were all
Arab-Swahili.6
This is not to say that the Arab-Swahili ranks did not also include ethnic Arabs from
the Arabian Peninsula and the Middle-East. Many traders from Oman, India, Saudi
Arabia and Baluchistan established their bases in Zanzibar and on the Swahili coast.
Whilst these newcomers had nothing ethnically in common with many of the Arab-
1
Echoes of Service: A Record of Labour for the Lord in Many Lands, no. 289, July 1893, p. 157.
2
Lary, P. and Wright, M., Swahili Settlements in Northern Zambia and Malawi, African Historical Studies, Vol.




Musambachime, M.C., A Reconstructed Biography of an East African Trader: Nshimba of Kilwa Island in the
South-West Corner of Lake Mweru, Zambia (Unpublished Work, University of Zambia), pp. 19-21.
5
Ibid., p. 3 and p. 5.
6
Ibid., p. 3 and p. 5.
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Swahili, they were linked by the Swahili language and culture and Islamic faith
shared by all at the coastal settlements.7
It is also useful to briefly examine the indigenous African peoples of the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor, such as the Tabwa, Lungu, Mambwe and Fipa, so as to better
understand the situation in the region during the nineteenth-century. These peoples
were reliant upon subsistence agriculture and the exploitation of their local natural
resources and had no mercantile ambitions of their own beyond trade with their
immediate neighbours. They were also made up of a relatively rigid social hierarchy
of noble and commoners.8
However, with regards to succession and descent, there are some key differences
between these peoples. The Fipa possessed a system of hereditary paramounts but
appointed sub-chiefs, consequently succession rarely caused an issue in their lands.
The Lungu, Mambwe and Tabwa on the other hand, possessed entirely hereditary
chiefly systems, meaning that their traditions of succession were far more important.9
Whilst the majority of the peoples of the region were patrilineal, in that descent
followed the male line, the Tabwa were matrilineal, as were the royal clan of the
Lungu. This leads to confusion abounding during periods of interregnum as various
claimants to the throne pushed their ambitions. Matrilineal succession encourages
polygamy on a large scale, as succession occurs through the female line and
therefore it is important to know who the previous chiefs chief wife was so as to be
able to ascertain his successor. As often occurred, numerous different sons and
claimants would maintain that their mother was the chief wife rather than their
opponents and this naturally led to conflict and rivalry.10 This became even more
confused if the paramount had brothers, and if they then also had sons. As can be
seen in the Tabwa royal genealogy included in this thesis, it was not unusual for the
paramountcy to move between various males of different family lines and this was
something that was particularly influential when the Arab-Swahili arrived in the
Corridor.
7
Musambachime, Nshimba of Kilwa Island, p. 15.
8
Brelsford, W.V., The Tribes of Northern Rhodesia (The Government Printer, Lusaka, 1956), p. 65.
9
Willis, R.G., East Central Africa Part XV: The Fipa and Related Peoples of South-West Tanzania and North-East
Zambia (International African Institute, London, 1966), p. x.
10
Brelsford, Tribes of Northern Rhodesia, p. 66.
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According to R.G. Willis, what linked all the groups of the region was a pattern of
concentrated settlements and shared communal values, with membership of the
village community emphasised. Therefore, these groups were naturally quite
populous and sociable, attracting both slave raiders and coastal traders.11 In
addition, they all shared similar Bemba-based languages and had mutually
recognisable cultures, which meant the boundaries and borders between the various
peoples were by no means distinct or finalised.12 This made political control more
often a case of the most powerful chief in the region holding precedence, although
some villages were traditionally associated with a particular paramount.
A final important linguistic point that must be made in this section regards some of
the terminology that will be used throughout this thesis. Many of the African peoples
of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor were of Bantu origins and therefore so were the
roots of their languages. A particular nuance of Bantu languages is the use of
prefixes to change the meaning of the word. For example, an individual member of
the Tabwa ethnicity would be called a Tabwa, whereas when referring to the Tabwa
as an entire people the ba- or wa- prefix would be added so that it became
BaTabwa. Whilst this appears rarely in this thesis, a particularly important prefix
that will be used extensively is the prefix u- or i- to denote the country belonging
to the people in question. For example, Itabwa is the home country of the Tabwa
people, whilst Ulungu is the home of the Lungu and Ufipa the home of the Fipa.
Whilst these can change slightly dependent upon the ethnicity of the speaker, in this
thesis the basic linguistic rules shown above will be used as standard.13
Primary and Secondary Sources
As has already been touched upon above, the sources for this thesis are somewhat
disparate, with very few covering the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor in any great detail.
Despite this, an assessment of the relevant secondary literature is essential in
understanding how historians have viewed the region and, particularly, how they
have viewed the long-distance trade and its violent reverberations.
11
Willis, The Fipa and Related Peoples, p. xi.
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In charting the history of the coastal traders in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor, this
thesis will principally rely upon historical records, such as the Foreign Office
correspondence from the officials of the British Central African Protectorate and the
Echoes of Service, the in-house journal of the missionaries of the Plymouth
Brethren. It will also use various travelogues and published diaries of the numerous
European observers who travelled through East-Central Africa in the middle to late
decades of the nineteenth-century. These individuals include such famous names as
David Livingstone, Richard Burton and Joseph Thomson, all of whom wrote
extensively of their times spent in the Central African interior.
Explorers journals are a particularly vital source in the study of pre-colonial African
history as they are often some of the only written eye-witness sources available.
However, it is important to be wary of the inherent bias contained within many of
these diaries, travelogues and journals as they are very much products of the era in
which they were written. Not only are they often chauvinistic and racist towards both
the Africans and Arab-Swahili encountered, but they are also very much influenced
by the audience the author was writing for.
For example, Livingstone, Alfred Swann and Edward Coode Hore were all committed
opponents of the slave trade and, therefore, present the Arab-Swahili in generally a
very poor light, regardless of the individuals actual involvement in the slave trade.14
Whereas, Burtons expedition was financed by the Royal Geographical Society and
in his journals he appeared far less concerned with the moral issues of the long-
distance trade and more interested in the potential exportable produce of East-
Central Africa.15 Lionel Decle was an important nineteenth-century European
observer, for he was employed by the French government, one of the few colonial
powers without territorial interests in and around Mweru-Tanganyika, but, as a
14
Livingstone, D. [Waller, H. (ed.)], The Last Journals of David Livingstone in Central Africa. From Eighteen
Hundred and Sixty-Five to his Death, Continued by a Narrative of his Last Moments and Sufferings, Obtained
from his Faithful Servants Chuma and Susi (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1875), vol. 1 + 2, Swann, A.J. (with
Johnston H.H.), Fighting the Slave-Hunters in Central Africa: A Record of Twenty-Six Years of Travel and
Adventure Round the Great Lakes and of the Overthrow of Tip-Pu-Tib, Rumaliza and Other Great Slave Traders
(J.B. Lippincott Co./Seeley and Co. Ltd., Philadelphia/London, 1910) and Hore, E.C., Tanganyika: Eleven Years
in Central Africa (2
nd
Ed.) (Edward Stanford, London, 1892).
15
Burton, R.F., The Lake Regions of Central Africa: A Picture of Exploration (Longman, Green, Longman and
Roberts, London, 1860), vol. 1, p. 15.
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naturalised British citizen, was always positive and supportive regarding British
colonial efforts in Central Africa.16
In addition, this thesis will engage extensively with the large body of secondary
historical research that has been published regarding the events and peoples of
Mweru-Tanganyika during the nineteenth-century. Whilst the sources described here
will be examined in greater detail below, several vital secondary sources must be
mentioned to highlight their importance in understanding the Arab-Swahili
involvement in the African interior in this period. These sources are: Lary and
Wrights 1971 article regarding Swahili Settlements in Northern Zambia; Andrew
Roberts article presenting his edited remarks of the colonially gathered History of
Abdullah ibn Suliman from 1967; Andrew Roberts 1973 monograph A History of the
Bemba, Christopher St Johns chapter on Kazembe, the Arab-Swahili and the
Corridor from Richard Gray and David Birminghams book from 1970 on pre-colonial
African trade; and Mwelwa Musambachimes unpublished essay on the history of
Nshimba of Kilwa Island.17
Lary and Wrights article-length study of Arab-Swahili traders in Northern Zambia
and Malawi is among the few historical works specifically concerned with the subject
of this thesis. It forms a foundation for this work and provides an essential starting
point. Whilst necessarily brief and analytically underdeveloped, Lary and Wrights
piece makes several important assertions that link together the three main
protagonists of this thesis: the African peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor;
the Arab-Swahili; and the European colonialists. The article states that activities of
coastal traders must be considered alongside European exploration and that
geopolitical history and commercial geography were closely intertwined in the
region.18 This perspective is vital to avoid overtly Eurocentric explanations to the
Arab-Swahili infiltration into the centre of the African continent. Lary and Wright are
particularly successful at reminding the historian that the Arab-Swahili traders did not
16
Decle, L. (with Stanley, H.M.), Three Years in Savage Africa (Methuen and Co., London, 1898).
17
Lary and Wright, Swahili Settlements, Roberts, A.D., The History of Abdullah ibn Suliman, African Social
Research, 4 (December 1967), Roberts, A.D., A History of the Bemba: Political Growth and change in the north-
eastern Zambia before 1900 (Longman, London, 1973), St John, C., Kazembe and the Tanganyika-Nyasa
Corridor, 1880-1890, in Birmingham, D. and Gray, R. (eds.), Pre-Colonial African Trade: essays on trade in
Central and Eastern Africa before 1900 (Oxford University Press, 1970) and Musambachime, Nshimba of Kilwa
Island.
18
Lary and Wright, Swahili Settlements, p. 547.
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operate as a cohesive force. Rather, they often consisted of relatively small caravans
led by individual traders, each of whom ventured into the African interior with only
tentative support from fellow traders in the region.
The article is similarly insightful in charting the changes in Arab-Swahili/African
political relationships. According to Lary and Wright, the switch from a policy of
neutrality to one of active, and often violent, involvement in African internal affairs
coincided with the arrival of Tippu Tip in Mweru-Tanganyika in the 1860s. This
argument will be elaborated upon in the first chapter of this thesis, which is devoted
to the early history of the coastal traders in the interior and how they came to
dominate both the economy and politics of Mweru-Tanganyika by the second half of
the nineteenth-century.19
A central aim of this thesis is to update the work of Lary and Wright and provide a
more rounded history of the Arab-Swahili in the Corridor than they were able to offer
in their short article. This thesis supplements their work by providing a fuller
discussion of both the economics of the Arab-Swahili long-distance trade and the
commodities involved, and also of the patterns of violence that accompanied the
arrival of coastal traders in the interior.
Andrew Roberts introduction to his edition of the colonially collected History of
Abdullah ibn Suliman, almost unique as a non-European testimony describing the
activities of coastal traders in Mweru-Tanganyika, is also of fundamental
importance.20 Roberts notes are especially useful when presenting the situation that
the Europeans found in Mweru-Tanganyika upon their arrival and in describing the
process by which the Arab-Swahili stranglehold on the region was broken.21
The History of Abdullah presents a full and accurate history of the trader Abdullah
ibn Suliman. This provides an excellent case study of a leading coastal trader and
his response to the arrival of European colonial institutions in a land that had been
largely under his heel in previous decades. In Abdullahs case, it shows how some of
the Arab-Swahili were able to ingratiate themselves into the ranks of the British
19
Lary and Wright, Swahili Settlements, pp. 551-556.
20




colonial administration and act as chiefs of the villages they had previously taken
control over when they had first arrived in the region.22
Andrew Roberts also wrote A History of the Bemba, another essential piece of
historical research that informed the writing of this thesis. In his book, Roberts largely
focusses on the interactions between the Arab-Swahili traders and African political
elites in southern Mweru-Tanganyika. It was particularly helpful in exemplifying a
relationship of cooperation between an African people, namely the Bemba, and the
coastal traders in the second half of the nineteenth-century, when the majority of
Arab-Swahili activity was violent or politically intrusive. The Bemba and Arab-Swahili
were almost entirely able to avoid conflict and, instead, maintained a mutually
beneficial commercial relationship, whereby the coastal traders received the slaves
and ivory they desired and the Bemba received firearms so as to maintain their
military advantage over their neighbours and rivals.
This last point was particularly important in informing the debate over the importance
of firearms in Central Africa in the nineteenth-century that is presented in Chapter 3.
Roberts himself is sceptical of the importance of guns militarily for the Bemba during
this period, but he also suggests that the growing supply of them in Ubemba meant
that they inevitably became a part of Bemba society. This is an important cultural
side of the firearms debate that is often overlooked by western historians who
assume firearms are limited to having militaristic importance alone.
The fourth piece of secondary research that proved invaluable in the completion of
this thesis was St Johns chapter in Pre-Colonial African Trade. St John provided the
basis for the second chapter of the thesis with an extensive amount of information on
the economy of Mweru-Tanganyika, particularly its involvement in commercial
networks of exchange, be they the pre-existing regional trade routes or the later
Arab-Swahili run long-distance trade.23
St Johns discussion of regional trade remains relevant in the modern historiography.
Besides describing at some length the locally-produced commodities exchanged by
the peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika, St Johns work highlights the fact that the
interconnectedness of African peoples predated the inception of the continent-
22
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spanning long-distance trade routes. He suggests that the lack of direct contact
between two given African peoples should not be taken to imply that the
communities in question were not indirectly connected through the regional trade
networks that saw such essential items as iron and salt move between different
locales.24
This idea was essential in understanding that the Arab-Swahili did not introduce
commerce to East-Central Africa and, in fact, found regularly-used regional networks
of exchange already in existence and exploited these pre-existing routes for their
own gain. They were able to connect with mercantile African peoples such as the
Nyamwezi who helped them to extend the reach of the long-distance trade without
initially having to penetrate all the way to the centre of the African continent. In
addition, this partnership allowed them to infiltrate African polities and chiefdoms
economically through the trading networks that the Africans themselves had
originally established. An example of this is the Nyamwezi ivory caravan route that
reached Kazembe in the first decades of the nineteenth-century. With a trade in ivory
already relatively longstanding, the Arab-Swahili were able to use this same route to
the Eastern Lunda paramount and gradually monopolise the trade, offering cheaper
trade goods than the Nyamwezi were able to afford, pushing out the African
merchants.
The final secondary source that inspired this thesis is the unpublished study of the
trader Nshimba of Kilwa Island, by Musambachime. This work provided a second
case study, after Roberts of Abdullah, of a leading coastal trader in Mweru-
Tanganyika and his reaction to the arrival of the European colonialists, in this case
the C.F.S., in the region previously dominated by him and his men. Musambachimes
work was essential in exploring the military confrontations between coastal traders
and European powers and how some Arab-Swahili fought on in the hope of carving
out their own independent merchant principalities based upon their old tactics of
raiding for slaves and ivory.25
In addition, Musambachimes work provides an insight into the world of the Arab-
Swahili caravans and the ruga-ruga. Chapter 3 will discuss how the most trusted and
24




loyal servants of the coastal traders would sometimes be chosen to lead caravans
for their masters and it was not unheard of for these men to then break off and form
their own caravans and groups of ruga-ruga, with which to raid and trade in East-
Central Africa. Nshimba of Kilwa Island is one such trader, having originally been
brought to Zanzibar as a slave and entrusted with the running of caravans for his
Zanzibari master. Therefore, this biography shows the process by which slaves
within Arab-Swahili society had the opportunity for personal advancement and could
even become arguably amongst the most feared Arab-Swahili traders in the whole
Mweru-Tanganyika region.26
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1. The Work of Plunder Begins
27
 The Early
History of Arab-Swahili Traders in Mweru-
Tanganyika
This chapter will lay the foundations for the rest of this thesis and will examine the
When?, Where? and Who? of Arab-Swahili long-distance trade in the East
African interior during its initial period. It will also establish an accurate chronology of
the activities of the most prominent coastal traders, from their first forays into the
interior in the early 1800s, up until the 1870s and the arrival of European
representatives.
The key protagonists of the Arab-Swahili trade will be discussed, as well as their
main areas of operation and periods of activity. Particular reference will be made to
Hamed bin Mohammed el-Murjebi, more commonly known as Tippu Tip, and his
relatives and henchmen of the el-Murjebi Arab-Swahili clan. François Bontinck and
Tippu Tip himself both give the impression of this group as a longstanding family
enterprise, something comparable to an Italo-American Mafia family. Tippu Tips
father ran the trading business until he settled to rule and trade from the Arab-
Swahili city of Tabora in modern-day Tanzania, after which Tippu Tip, his brothers,
his uncles, various other male in-laws and a host of associates and henchmen took
over the long-distance caravan trade into the interior of the continent.28
The British explorer, Verney Lovett Cameron was amongst the many that were
impressed by the el-Murjebi clan traders and following his initial meeting with Tippu
Tip described thus; He was a good looking man, and the greatest dandy I had seen
amongst the traders. And, notwithstanding his being perfectly black, he was a
thorough Arab, for curiously enough the admixture of Negro blood had not rendered
him less of an Arab in his ideas and manners. He also wrote that Tippu Tip and his
27
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father were two of the richest and most influential of the travelling Zanzibar
merchants.29
During the 1860s and 1870s, these traders held such power and influence over the
chiefs, people and land of the region that it would not be out of place to call them the
overlords of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor, having subdued leading local
paramount chiefs and kings such as the Nsamas of the Tabwa and the Eastern
Lunda rulers of Kazembe. The traders of the el-Murjebi clan effectively determined
the direction and policy of the Arab-Swahili long-distance trade in the African interior
from the 1850s onwards, popularising new routes and destinations and pioneering
new methods.
The Arab-Swahili activities between Lakes Mweru and Tanganyika will be examined
in detail to chart the changing socio-economic and political landscape in the region
and to better understand the situation that the European colonial administrators
found upon their arrival in the last 15 years of the nineteenth century.
Of special concern to this chapter is the effort to periodise Arab-Swahili activities in
the interior and to describe the factors that led such traders to acquire evermore
significant politico-military leverage. Arab-Swahili traders were initially entirely reliant
upon African chiefs for the continuation of trade and their own survival in the interior.
However, by the second half of the nineteenth century they had become major
power-brokers, capable of installing subservient puppet chiefs at will, slaving
extensively with little real opposition, and demanding tribute of vast quantities of
ivory, copper, salt or any local resource they desired. It was the increasingly
exploitative nature of the Arab-Swahili modus operandi that led British explorer
Burton to pen the following description in his travelogue, The Lake Regions of
Central Africa;
They [the Arab-Swahili traders] act less like traders than highwayman. By
every petty art of mercantile diplomacy, now by force, then by fraud, by
promises, or by bribes of cloth  the work of plunder begins.30
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This chapter will illustrate the effects of the transformation in tactics employed by
coastal traders and assess the significance of Tippu Tip and his associates in
bringing about this change.
1.1 The Beginnings of Arab-Swahili Activities in the Interior, 1800-1830
In attempting to establish an accurate chronology of the early years of the Arab-
Swahili long-distance trade, the problem of obtaining reliable information and
contemporary sources is immediately apparent. Before the arrival of such prominent
explorers as Livingstone and Burton, written sources pertaining to the activities of
coastal traders in the Mweru-Tanganyika region are few and far between. The Arab-
Swahili traders themselves wrote almost nothing about this early period. The
Zanzibari trader Said bin Habib commented in a narrative that was collected by, and
presented to, the Bombay Geographical Society in 1860:
I have never written down anything I observed during my travels, because
Arabs take no interest in the discovery of foreign countries, and do not care to
hear of anything unconnected with the acquisition of riches.31
However, the records of Portuguese and Luso-African explorers and traders from
both Mozambique and Angola assist in overcoming this lack of information. Two of
the most important of these travelogues are; Burtons translation of the record of Dr
Francisco José de Lacerda e Almeidas 1798 expedition to Kazembe; and Ian
Cunnisons translation of Antonio Gamittos diary of the 1831 Portuguese expedition
to that same Eastern Lunda polity.32
It is generally accepted by historians that there were trading links from the coast to
Kazembe, and even to Katanga beyond that, in the first decades of the nineteenth
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century.33 Abdul Sheriff, for example, suggests 1810 as the date that the kingdom of
Kazembe began to shift its trade eastwards rather than south towards the
Portuguese East African holdings.34 However, it would be a mistake to assume that
this very early trade bore any resemblance to the era of the great caravan routes and
Arab-Swahili merchant princes of the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It is
also crucial to understand that the coastal traders at the turn of the nineteenth
century were not lone pioneers forging previously unheard of routes deep into the
interior. In fact, they followed in the footsteps of a number of African trading peoples,
relying heavily upon the pre-existing routes they discovered as they pushed the
boundaries of the hinterland of Zanzibar further and further west across the
continent.
Foremost amongst these peoples were the Nyamwezi of west-central Tanzania.
Nyamwezi professional or semi-professional traders filled the void left by those
groups who considered themselves rulers, agriculturalists or pastoralists and
therefore above or unwilling to trade over long distances.35 This idea is confirmed by
St John when he claims that the indigenous groups of the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor only had themselves to blame for not taking part in the long-distance trade
from its very inception.36
Thus, the Nyamwezi were some of the first key intermediaries in the chain that saw
resources from the interior reaching the east coast of the African continent. For
example, Lacerda suggested that in 1798 ivory from Kazembe was reaching the
hands of coastal traders through African intermediaries. This would substantiate the
idea of various mercantile groups representing different links in the chain that ran
from the source in the interior to the coast. Thomas Q. Reefe and Jan Vansina both
33
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claim that the African mercantile peoples were in contact and trading with Kazembe
50 years prior to Lacerdas expedition and had contact with Arab-Swahili traders
throughout this period.37
The Nyamwezi were a group of African peoples, by no means homogenous or
following any one political leader, who had been trading iron, salt and agricultural
produce regionally throughout the 1700s and around 1800  seem to have
discovered the rewards of long-distance trade.38 They began to range further and
further afield and trade new items, such as ivory and copper, for imported goods,
such as guns and beads. However, Sheriff maintains that the Nyamwezi always
focussed more upon ivory than slave trading throughout the first decades of the
nineteenth century.39
This involvement in the long-distance trade quickly developed beyond a simple
means of wealth accumulation for the Nyamwezi, allowing young men to escape the
control of the elders for the first time and it soon became an accepted way of life
and a source of male prestige in Nyamwezi culture.40 It would even significantly
influence Nyamwezi politics. The traditional commercial monopolies of the Nyamwezi
chiefs proved unenforceable, allowing anyone to begin trading. This formed what
Sheriff calls a new agrico-commercial bourgeoisie of Nyamwezi long-distance
traders.41 These Nyamwezi would cooperate with the first coastal traders penetrating
the interior, selling the goods they had bought from the chiefs and kings of the
interior to these Arab-Swahili traders who had ventured west beyond the littoral of
the Swahili coast. These traders would then transport the resources east to the
markets of the coast and Zanzibar. Andrew Roberts goes so far as to suggest that it
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had been the sight of Nyamwezi traders on the Swahili coast that had first inspired
the Arab-Swahili to venture into the East African interior themselves.42
Whether that was the true inspiration for the expansion in Arab-Swahili trade or not,
the Nyamwezi and coastal traders soon found themselves inextricably linked.
However, the era of peaceful trading cooperation between African chiefs, Arab-
Swahili traders and their African intermediaries was not to last beyond the first few
decades of the nineteenth century.
For the Nyamwezi, the long-distance trade proved both a blessing and a curse. The
expansion of trade routes across Unyamwezi to Lake Tanganyika, and thence
onwards north or south around the lake or westwards across it, saw them perfectly
situated to exploit the trade as it passed through their homeland. However, the Arab-
Swahili came to dictate commercial proceedings in Unyamwezi, which inevitably led
to a domination of the political sphere as well. Using similar politico-military
interventionist methods to those that would be employed by Tippu Tip in Itabwa in
the 1860s, the Arab-Swahili expanded west away from the Swahili coast and into the
heart of Unyamwezi.43 By this point, the Nyamwezi were so involved in the long-
distance trade that any attempt to oppose the coastal dominance of their land would
certainly spell disaster for their own economic system, reliant as it was on
commercial routes that crossed the region. Sheriff describes it thus;
The Nyamwezi were unable to apply the ultimate sanction, which would have
cut their own throats equally with those of the coastal traders; the Nyamwezi
merchant class were unable to destroy their twin brother.44
The effect of this was to initiate what became a rapidly developing trend in
Nyamwezi society, wherein young men hired themselves out as porters to coastal
caravans heading westwards into the interior. Burton wrote that The extension of
traffic induced the country people (Nyamwezi) to enlist as porters.45 The Arab-
Swahili traders were far more inclined to rely on professional Nyamwezi porters, in
whose interest it was for the caravans to succeed, rather than slaves doubling as
porters, who would take any opportunity to flee their captors and thus lose the
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traders not only the slave but also the goods they were carrying. Tippu Tip claimed
to only use slaves as porters because there was no other means of transport for
their goods instead of trusting to slaves.46
Porterage became such a central part of Nyamwezi culture that the majority of young
men spent their free time during the year on safari (the Swahili word for a trading
expedition) and it was considered a test of manhood and rite of passage.47 It
effectively gave the Nyamwezi two separate economies: a subsistence agriculture
economy at home; and a wage economy when they hired themselves out as porters
for the caravans. Jan-Georg Deutsch suggests porterage was one of the main
sources of income for the Nyamwezi by the 1850s and claims that by the 1890s
nearly one-third of all young male Nyamwezi were engaged as porters in the caravan
trade.48 Andrew Roberts claims that the existing relationship between coastal traders
and Nyamwezi porters was made official in 1840 by order of the Imam of Zanzibar,
with the Nyamwezi practically endorsed as the official porters for Arab-Swahili
traders venturing into the East African interior.49
1.2 The Arab-Swahili Rise to Prominence, 1830s-1850
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, the bulk of eastern Lunda trade with
the east coast had passed through the hands of African intermediaries, but by the
1830s, these middlemen found themselves increasingly marginalised as a result of
the inception of a direct link between the eastern Lunda and Arab-Swahili long-
distance operators. Drawing on Gamittos diary, Giacomo Macola asserts that by this
time the Lunda of Kazembe were receiving all of their cloth from the coastal traders
and sending almost all of their ivory and slaves east in return, despite having trading
links through the Mwata Yamvo and Lunda heartland to the west coast of the
continent. However, he also maintains that the number of traders actually present in
the Mweru-Tanganyika region remained small throughout this period.50
From this point onwards, the Arab-Swahili penetration of the Mweru-Tanganyika
region only increased in pace. It was the 1840s that saw truly large numbers of
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coastal traders arrive in the region for the first time. Cunnison calls this the beginning
of the Arab era and many of the first European explorers would later refer to traders
they met during their travels who had spent the 1840s west of Tanganyika around
Kazembe and Lake Mweru.51 In Across Africa, Verney Lovett Cameron recalled
meeting a coastal trader by the name of Mohamed ibn Salib who had been west of
the Arab-Swahili trading port of Ujiji on Lake Tanganyikas eastern shoreline since
1842 as a guest in the kingdom of Kazembe.52
In addition, the narrative of Said bin Habib dates his activities west of Tanganyika
near Mweru and Kazembe to 1844 at the latest, certainly suggesting that the region
had growing numbers of Arab-Swahili visitors. The date 1844 is based upon ibn
Habibs own assertion that he left for the African interior 16 years before the
recording of his narrative. Therefore, if it was recorded in the same year as its
publication in 1860, it would date the activities described as occurring during 1844.
He also maintains that the name of the Kazembe when he visited was Chareka, a
corruption of the name of Kazembe IV, Chibangu Keleka. Tippu Tips grandfather,
Rajab bin Mohamed bin Said el-Murjebi, is known to have traded in the Tanganyika
region so it is conceivable that ibn Habib was part of the increased number of Arab-
Swahili traders visiting the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor in the 1840s.53
Lary and Wright describe this period as one in which the Arab-Swahili traders were
turning sporadic contact with Kazembe and the Mweru-Tanganyika region into
continuous trade. This continued into the second half of the nineteenth century, the
golden age of Arab-Swahili trade in the East African interior.54 However, despite
their growing numbers and the increasing volume of their trade, coastal merchants
did not have it all their own way. In the 1840s the regional African potentates still
controlled their kingdoms unopposed and their wealth and support had yet to be
dissolved to such a degree as to allow the traders to ignore their will and
commandments.
For example, Kazembe IV Chibangu Keleka was able to detain traders almost at will
during this period and keep them sequestered as guests at his capital, as attested
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by Mohamed ibn Salib. Gamittos expedition was effectively held captive at the
Kazembes capital from November 1831 until the summer of the following year. The
explorer famously claimed during this period that We are virtually prisoners. In
addition, he reported meeting Arab-Swahili traders at the Kazembes capital upon
the expeditions arrival in 1831. According to these traders, they had been held at the
capital for at least 6 months prior to the Portuguese arrival.55 Kazembe IV was still
able to limit who the coastal traders were able to trade with throughout his kingdom,
maintaining his vital monopoly on the long-distance trade. According to Macola, the
traders were banned from contact with regional governors and commoners, proving
that the Kazembes still possessed a high level of authority during this period.56
However, Kazembe IV was repeatedly unable to obtain enough ivory to trade with
the Europeans, possibly suggesting his hold on the kingdom was not as solid as
initially imagined.57
Equally telling was the confrontation between an Arab-Swahili party and a powerful
local Tabwa ruler, Nsama III Chipili Chipioka. Burton, who heard the story at Ujiji in
1858, reported that in 1841-1842 a coastal caravan had headed south down Lake
Tanganyika to the Marungu Massif and Itabwa, on the lakes extreme south-western
tip, and it had then fallen foul of local politics and the Tabwa paramount, Nsama. The
200-strong caravan, which comprised several coastal traders: Mohamed bin Salib,
Suleiman bin Nassir, Abd el Al ibn Habib, Nasir bin Salim el-Harisi and Rashid bin
Salim el-Harisi, had been drawn into fighting Nsama III by a local chief called
Mtambara. They managed to kill Nsamas brother, only for a Tabwa counterattack to
force the traders to flee, whereupon Nsama and his men seized the traders goods
and burnt their boats, leaving the surviving traders to head west to the lands of
Kazembe.58 Here they collected ivory and copper to build up the funds and number
of porters required to return to the coast.59
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This story exemplifies the overall position of the Arab-Swahili traders in the Mweru-
Tanganyika region in the 1840s. Whilst possessing firearms and representing an
obvious potential ally for any disgruntled local chiefs, coastal traders as yet lacked
the numbers, organisation and desire to fully embroil themselves in the political
power-struggles of the interior. In addition, the aforementioned overlords and
paramounts, such as Nsama III, were, during this period, still strong enough and
possessed enough authority to violently oppose any trader willing to lock horns with
them.
Christopher St John calls the mercantile economy of this period a market-oriented
coast-to-coast trade and presents it as almost inevitable that the coastal trade would
grow from these beginnings, with such well-developed internal trade networks
already present. However, he does question whether the African commercial
peoples, such as the Nyamwezi, alone would have been able to break through from
regional trade to the long-distance trade without the external influence of traders
from the Swahili coastline and Zanzibari islands.60
1.3 The Golden Age of Arab-Swahili Trade in Mweru-Tanganyika
The second half of this chapter will examine the Golden Age of the Arab-Swahili
trade in the Mweru-Tanganyika region, which roughly corresponded to the third
quarter of the nineteenth century (1850-1880). Sheriff asserts that if this period is
called the Arab-Swahili Golden Age then the El Dorado of the Zanzibari traders by
the 1850s had shifted to eastern Zaire.61 There is almost unchallenged agreement
throughout the historiography that this period was one of Arab-Swahili dominance
and political pre-eminence in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor.62
In comparison to the events of the preceding half century, this era was one of
famous personalities, be they African warlords, Arab-Swahili traders or European
explorers. Some of these prominent figures, such as Tippu Tip, Burton and
Livingstone, have been briefly mentioned already and it is their actions that will
dominate our narrative. However, this thesis is not a biography of any one of these
individuals, and its aim is to use these personal trajectories to cast light on broader
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regional developments. It is indeed vital to remember that these figures were the
products of wider social groups and attitudes and that they acted very much in line
with the thinking that had influenced them.
This later period differs from the earlier one in that sources of primary information are
more numerous. The travelogues of European explorers, such as Burton,
Livingstone, Cameron, Hore and Thomson, provide useful information on the
activities of the coastal traders in the Mweru-Tanganyika region, particularly on Tippu
Tips conflict with the Tabwa of Nsama III, the Ujijian traders on Lake Tanganyika
and Bemba - Arab-Swahili trading cooperation.63 There also exist Arab-Swahili
accounts of this period, including Tippu Tips autobiography translated and
annotated by François Bontinck, Andrew Roberts History of Abdullah ibn Suliman
and Musambachimes reconstructed biography of Nshimba of Kilwa Island (both
largely sourced from Northern Rhodesian district notebooks which had recorded the
original histories).64 Finally, there is even an African source on this period in the
Mweru-Tanganyika region written by Mwata Kazembe XIV Shadreck Chinyanta
Nankula, assisted by Father E. Labrecque of the White Fathers. This relates the
historical traditions of the Kingdom of Kazembe and provides their official royal
viewpoint on the eras events.65
Whilst the 1840s had seen Central African kings and paramounts in the region stand
firm before the intruding traders, both Arab-Swahili and African, the 1850s would
prove to be a very different decade. The most obvious change was the willingness of
the traders to use violence to achieve their goals.
Msiri was from a long line of Nyamwezi traders who had been travelling from
Unyanyembe and the east coast of the continent, west past Kazembe and the
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Corridor and into the resource-rich region of Katanga.66 Whilst slightly beyond the
central focus of this thesis, Msiris conquest of Katanga provides a perfect insight
into the changing attitudes of the traders in the Interior. With his father, Kalasa-
Muzwiri, having secured trade routes back east around Lake Tanganyika some
years before, the way was open for Msiri to begin his career of vicious mercantile
exploitation and enter the world of African political leadership.
Msiri and his Yeke, or as they were soon to be renamed - Garenganze, entered
Kazembe heading west for Katanga around 1856. They collected ivory, copper,
slaves and other resources en route, trading them with the Arab-Swahili coastal
traders present in the Mweru-Tanganyika region.67 Upon arrival in Katanga, Msiri set
up slaving operations and began to seize ivory from local chiefs, exploiting the trade
routes previously opened up by his forefathers. Macola suggests that due to his
previous Arab-Swahili employment, Msiri and his men were extensively equipped
with firearms and this was a particularly telling factor in the conquest of Katanga.68
Following the death of the elderly Sanga chief, Msiri ascended to the throne of
Katanga, as the chiefs chosen successor according to Mwata Kazembe XIV, carving
out his own conquest state during the rest of the decade.69 These events constituted
potentially the first instance of a trader involving himself in local politics to such an
extent that he settled there permanently and seized political control.
In Mweru-Tanganyika, Arab-Swahili penetration continued much as it had throughout
the 1840s. The number of coastal traders visiting the region was increasing apace
but none had gone as far as Msiri and directly seized political control of the
kingdoms, polities and villages they were trading with. Reefe, for example, mentions
the trader Juma bin Salim wad Rakad (more famously known as Juma Merikani for
the vast quantities of American-made cloth he traded) journeying southwards on
Lake Tanganyika from Ujiji to Itabwa, where he stayed to trade for at least the next
decade. Vansina writes of two other traders who crossed Lake Tanganyika early in
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the 1850s, Said bin Habib in 1850-52 and Mohamed ibn Saleh shortly after, and St
John describes how the Fipa welcomed slave and ivory traders in 1857, possibly
referring to Mohamed ibn Salib and Abd el Al ibn Habib who had been defeated by
Nsama in the early 1840s but were still operating in the region.70
Burton famously visited Unyanyembe, Ujiji and Lake Tanganyika in the late 1850s
and commented particularly upon the rampant slave trade he found there. In a long
passage he expounded on the situation caused by the long-distance trade
throughout the 1850s;
The practice of slavery in East Africa, besides demoralising and brutalising
the race, leads to the results which effectively bar increase of population and
progress towards civilisation. These are commandos, or border wars, and
intestine confusion  A poor and powerful chief will not allow his neighbours
to rest wealthier than himself; a quarrel soon found, the strong attacks the
weaker, hunts and harries his cattle, burns his villages, carries off his subjects
and sells them to the first passing caravan. The inhabitants of the land have
thus become wolves to one another; their only ambition is to dispeople and
destroy, and the blow thus dealt to a thinly populated country strikes at the
very root of progress and prosperity.71
This encapsulates the chaos that the Arab-Swahili long-distance trade in the East
African Interior was causing during the 1850s, despite the fact that trader numbers in
the region were still growing. Burton was also particularly disdainful of the Arab-
Swahili traders that he found at Ujiji. He wrote that they were a race so dependent
for comfort and pleasure upon trade and that the rise in the price of slaves and
ivory has compelled Arab merchants  to push their explorations beyond the
Tanganyika Lake.72 It was this lure of greater profit that would draw evermore
traders from the coast to the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and precipitated an era of
intensive violence, turmoil and exploitation.
The 1860s and 1870s truly were the decades of the Arab-Swahili trader in the East
African interior. Led by a new generation of young traders, the coastal operators
70
Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savannah, p. 235 and St John, Kazembe and the Corridor, p. 221.
71
Burton, Lake Regions, vol. 2, pp. 309-310.
72
Burton, Lake Regions vol. 1, p. 295 and vol. 2, p. 52.
34
were able to penetrate and succeed in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor as never
before. In many ways, this was as a result of the change in tactics pioneered by
Tippu Tip and his family and associates of the el-Murjebi Arab-Swahili trader clan.
Therefore, much of this section of the chapter will be devoted to the exploits of this
clique of traders, including such figures as: Mohamed bin Masud al-Wardi or
Kumba Kumba (Tippu Tips half-brother and partner); Hamed bin Mohamed bin Said
or Bwana Nzige; Juma bin Sef bin Juma or Pembamoto; Salim bin Saleh-Nebhani
(also all brothers of Tippu Tip); Bwana Nziges son Rashid bin Mohamed Said or
Kamanga; Tippu Tips son, Mohamed bin Sef (who would later marry Bwana Nziges
daughter); and several of Tippu Tips uncles, including Bushir bin Habib bin Habib
Abdullah.73 One of Tippu Tips most important and trusted associates was Abdullah
ibn Suliman or Mundala/Selema, whose exploits will be examined in greater detail
below.74
What made the el-Murjebi cliques change in trading tactics so radical in the history
of the long-distance trade in Mweru-Tanganyika is that, for almost the first time;
traders were actively engaging in violence against kings, paramounts, chiefs and
headmen whom they had originally intended to do business with. However, this
violence was not without purpose, and the Arab-Swahili traders quickly found that
they could effectively dominate the local politics of reluctant trading partners by
violently opposing the current leader, whilst supporting a rebel pretender. Once
installed, this puppet ruler would rely entirely upon the foreign traders for his power
and therefore could be forced from the throne, either by the coastal traders
themselves with a new pretender to make chief or by the previously deposed king if
he was still alive and still had support from chiefs within the kingdom. As several
historians have pointed out, this allowed the traders to play kingmakers and
simultaneously enhance their own political power and economic position in the
region.75 This exact modus operandi was used in Itabwa with the Tabwa Nsamas
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and in Kazembe with the Mwata Kazembe. Brelsford describes how the Arab-Swahili
came to excel at this game of indirect political rule and influence.76
This process was actually made even easier with the Tabwa, due to an institution
present within their society called Kisama. Kisama occurs during the interregnum
period following the death of a Tabwa paramount. During this time there is much
confusion in the kingdom and all forms of theft, murder and kidnapping occur free of
intervention from the traditional chiefly authorities. Obviously, a period such as this
only aided the Arab-Swahili traders who were able to carry out any unsavoury acts
they wished with the general chaos of Kisama to cover their tracks. They could then
install their chosen successor to the throne and take the plaudits for helping to
restore order to the kingdom in so doing.77
A further break with the past was the practice of colonising and settling the lands
where the traders were looking for ivory, slaves and other goods. Prior to the 1860s,
traders had only stayed out of necessity or if they were unable to return to the coast.
Tippu Tip certainly changed that practice, staying for as long as 12 years in the
Interior on one of his expeditions.78 Obviously, such long stays required bases to be
built for the traders to operate from and Tippu Tip came to use Itabwa, under the
control of his brother Kumba Kumba and later Abdullah ibn Suliman, as what was
effectively a depot for storing both supplies and the ivory and other resources that
the el-Murjebi traders would be returning with to the Swahili coast and Zanzibari
islands.
Having covered the key structural changes overseen by Tippu Tip and his
associates, it is now essential to continue with the chronology of events and discuss
Tippu Tips first expeditions into the Interior. It was Tippu Tips second incursion
between 1863 and 1869 that inaugurated the set of new practices summarised
above. His conflict with Nsama III Chipili Chipioka in Itabwa marked an
unmistakeable break from the ideas of old and was the harbinger of things to
come.79 Having left Dar es Salaam with a caravan of 120 armed men, Tippu Tip first
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headed inland to Mwamba Mutali, a great regional chief of the Bemba and second
only in influence to Chitimukulu XXVII Mutale Chitapankwa, the Bemba paramount,
himself.80
In 1867 Tippu Tip intended to head north and trade in Itabwa, the realm of Nsama III.
However, Mwamba warned him against the journey, reportedly saying;
Cependant les indigènes de chez Mwamba me déconseillèrent fortement ce
voyage; ils desaient: Nallez pas chez Samu; sans doute il a beaucoup
divoire, mais cest un home perfide. Il a déjà massacré beaucoup dArabes,
de même que des Besars et gens de la Côte.81
Whether the Bemba chief was simply trying to keep the Arab-Swahili trading in
Ubemba or whether he was actually warning them about Nsama and his potentially
treacherous nature towards visiting traders, his advice was ignored and the traders
had entered Itabwa by May of that year.82 What happened next is not entirely clear,
although the undoubted result was full blown conflict between the Tabwa paramount
and Tippu Tip. Lary and Wright present the most even-handed assessment of the
events that led to violence.83 Tippu Tips interpretation was that Nsama was waiting
to trap and kill the traders, having lured them into his capital with promises of ivory to
trade. On the other hand, Livingstone claimed that the whole incident was an
accident.84 Lary and Wright suggest a more logical middle ground of Nsama simply
feeling threatened by a large band of armed men entering the capital of his
kingdom.85
According to Tippu Tip, Nsamas warriors ambushed the traders upon their entry into
the village, killing two of the Arab-Swahili and injuring Tippu Tip himself with two
arrows. In reply, the Arab-Swahili killed a number of the Tabwa and put Nsama III to
flight. Tippu Tip estimated over 200 Tabwa casualties in the first exchange, rising to
over 1000 by the time the traders had gained control of the village, however
Livingstone suggests the more modest figure of around 50 dead on each side.86
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Tippu Tips uncle, Bushir bin Habib bin Habib Abdullah, followed the Tabwa and
defeated them several more times in the following days. These events sent
shockwaves through the region as Livingstone famously reported.
The entire population of the country has received a shock from the conquest
of Nsama, and their views of the comparative values of bows and arrows and
guns have undergone a great change. Nsama was the Napoleon of these
countries; no one could stand before him, hence the defeat of the invincible
Nsama has caused a great panic  He (Nsama III) has been a great
conqueror in his time, and with bows and arrows was invincible. He is said to
have destroyed many native traders from Tanganyika, but twenty Arab guns
made him flee from his own stockade, and caused a great sensation in the
country.87
Nsamas downfall was no great victory for the Arab-Swahili, although they effectively
took control of his lands. Despite the defeat, Nsama III kept his throne until his death
in 1870 and Livingstone reported that, following the clash, few locals would trade
with the coastal traders out of fear. Tippu Tip himself reported this reaction from local
chiefs, writing;
Depuis que Samu avait été vaincu, tous les habitants de ces lieux me
craignaient. Cela était dû au fait quauparavant aucun chef indigène nétait
aussi puissant que Samu et Kazembe du Runda, lesquels avaient peur lun
de lautre.88
However, what Tippu Tips victory did accomplish was to popularise the famous
epithets of himself and his brother, Kumba Kumba. Both Tippu Tip which translates
as the gatherer of wealth and Kumba Kumba meaning the collector of people
were fitting titles for these individuals given their activities and notoriety in the
region.89
The succession crisis that enveloped Itabwa following Chipili Chipiokas death
perfectly demonstrated the Arab-Swahili method of playing various successors off
against one another. Kumba Kumba and Abdullah ibn Suliman had remained behind
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whilst Tippu Tip had headed onwards to Lake Mweru and beyond. The duo soon
came into conflict with Nsama IV Katandula for supposedly joining an anti-Arab-
Swahili alliance.90 Katandula was swiftly killed and replaced with Nsama V Kafwimbi,
Chipiokas original successor, whom Kumba Kumba had helped Katandula beat to
get to the throne.91
Soon, though, Kafwimbi was threatened by the many potential successors and sons
of the deceased Nsamas, including Chinama, Mukupa, Matipa, Mulenga and
Mukupa Katandula, and called upon his Arab-Swahili allies to help.92 After another
falling out and loss of their support, Nsama V Kafwimbi was killed and another
succession dispute between Mulenga and Chimutwe developed. Mulenga was soon
killed by Chimutwes resurgent coastal allies and Chimutwe became Nsama VI.
From these somewhat convoluted political alliances and conflicts, it can be
concluded that the Arab-Swahili in Mweru-Tanganyika supported a favourite
successor to the Tabwa throne only as long as that individual remained their loyal
ally and someone that they were able to manipulate. As soon as he attempted to turn
against his coastal backers, the traders would abandon or dispose of that chief, only
to replace him with another distant relative. Just as this was happening with rival
pretenders to the throne of Itabwa, the coastal traders were also becoming
increasingly involved in the politics of the eastern Lunda of Kazembe. As Cunnison
writes Kazembe was virtually ringed about by Arab and Nyamwezi traders and by
the Yeke kingdom which was now well established. These traders included Tippu
Tip in Itabwa, Said bin Habib at Mpweto, Hames Wodim Tagh in Ulungu and Funga
Funga, Juma Merikani, Said bin Umala and Mohamed Bogharib all actually within
the kingdom of Kazembe.93
After fighting with the Yeke in the west, Kazembe VII Muonga Sunkutu decided to
expel all Arab-Swahili from his kingdom in retaliation, the survivors fleeing to
Pembamoto in Itabwa.94 The Arab-Swahili were doubly convinced to start a conflict
with Kazembe, as an eastern Lunda royal pretender, Lukwesa Mpanga, had been
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hiding in Itabwa throughout the 1860s, searching out support to claim the throne.95
The combination of these two factors eventually led in 1872 to an Arab-Swahili
attack on Kazembe and Muonga, led by Pembamoto, Kumba Kumba and Hamed bin
Mohamed bin Juma and the incumbent Kazembe was soundly defeated by the
coastal traders.96
Lukwesa Mpanga was finally installed nearly 11 years after being deposed by
Muonga, but has since been vilified in Kazembes history for his associations with
the Arab-Swahili traders and for bringing in new patterns of political behaviour based
upon foreign intervention in internal affairs, according to Macola.97 Shortly after, both
Pembamoto and Kumba Kumbas son, Chafulukuta, were killed in battles to secure
the throne that they had just won for Lukwesa.98
These events marked the beginning of the end for uncontested African rule in the
Mweru-Tanganyika region. Macola perfectly describes a situation that many African
paramounts, who relied upon tribute from their under-chiefs, found themselves in
during this period, in his assessment of the effect of the burgeoning coastal trade on
the polity of Kazembe. The Kazembes needed to maintain a monopoly upon the
long-distance trade in the kingdom so as to control the redistributive networks of
trade goods that flowed outwards from the capital to regional governors, and thence
onwards to village chiefs and their people. In addition, they relied upon ivory as
tribute, which would be paid to the capital in return for the trade goods that the
Kazembe distributed. However, if individual chiefs and smaller headmen were able
to trade directly with the coastal traders, they would no longer provide ivory in tribute
to the Kazembe and would no longer need access to the kingdoms redistributive
networks for trade goods.99
This meant that the Kazembes lost control over their own kingdom, as there was little
benefit to be gained by chiefs who had previously paid tribute, when they could
simply trade their ivory directly with the traders themselves and receive trade goods
in return. This is but one example of the breakdown in the traditional tributary
systems of the larger Central African polities and highlights the indirect socio-political
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effects that the long-distance trade had on powerful kings and chiefs. Put simply, the
coastal traders were themselves replacing the rulers of these polities in the minds of
local chiefs and headmen by providing trade goods in return for ivory and slaves,
much in the same way as the old systems had done but without installing themselves
as overlords of these people. This is the genesis of Arab-Swahili traders wielding
very real political power in the Interior and replacing the traditional figures of
authority, either with themselves or with puppet rulers.100
These interventions in the internal affairs of African polities and kingdoms suggest
that in the 1860s and 1870s the Arab-Swahili traders operating in Mweru-Tanganyika
had indeed changed their modus operandi and that their new strategy owed much to
the example set by Tippu Tip and his immediate followers. Livingstone described the
scene he found in Itabwa in 1872, some 5 years after the original Arab-Swahili
takeover. He wrote:
Already the large district of Itabwa had tacitly allowed itself to be put under the
harrow by this ruffianly Zanzibar Arab. Blackmail is levied in all directions, and
the petty chiefs, although really under tribute to Nsama are sagacious enough
to keep on with the powers that be.101
The diplomacy and peaceful methods that had characterised the actions of
pioneering coastal traders had been rendered obsolete by Tippu Tip. Greater
ambition, political involvement and reliance on military strength became the
distinguishing traits of the traders of Tippu Tips generation. Geddie wrote an apt
summary of this changed modus operandi. He describes how the methods of Tippu
Tip and his el-Murjebi clan associates had become the norm by the time explorers
such as Cameron and Livingstone arrived in the Mweru-Tanganyika region.
The slave-traders found it the easiest task imaginable to set the tribes at each
others throats. These ruffians having gained complete ascendency with their
fire-arms, sided first with one party and then with another, and when the
combatants were sufficiently weak they all fell an easy prey.102
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2. What do you wish to buy, if not slaves or
ivory?
103
 Slavery, Ivory and the Economy of the
Long-Distance Trade
Whilst the previous chapter established an accurate chronology of the pre-colonial
Arab-Swahili trade in the East African interior, this chapter will focus primarily on the
economic dimension of the long-distance trade, and the items and resources around
which it revolved. These commodities ranged from slaves, ivory and cloth, to
minerals such as copper and iron, salt and agricultural produce including millet, rice,
maize, cotton and tobacco. However, it is not simply the items of trade that require
discussion, and therefore this chapter will also describe the caravan trade and the
effects it had upon the regions and peoples who came into contact with it.
It is vital to remember that the long-distance trade to Mweru-Tanganyika did not
operate in isolation and that the coastal traders who reached the west of Lake
Tanganyika passed through a variety of regions during their treks into the interior.
The peoples of these countries were deeply involved with the passing traders and
the Arab-Swahili often used the villages and chiefs they visited to restock their
caravans with food and other supplies. This brought almost every group of people
between Zanzibar and Katanga into contact with the long-distance trade to some
degree, even though not all of them were directly involved in slave raiding or
porterage. The British explorer and anti-slavery crusader, Alfred Swann, described
this process as octopus-like, grasping every small unprotected village
community.104
This chapter will be subdivided into two main sections. The opening section will
discuss, in detail, the main commodities of the long-distance trade. Such
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commodities are best understood as falling into two categories. Firstly, the two
central Arab-Swahili exports leaving the interior, namely ivory and slaves will be
discussed. Second, the other commercial items of the long-distance trade will be
examined. These ranged from the trade goods taken into the interior by the Arab-
Swahili traders, such as cloth and beads, to the locally-produced items and
resources that had been traded from the time of the earliest regional networks of
exchange and continued to be traded following the entrance of East Africa into the
world economy.
The final section of this chapter will focus upon the wider impact of the trade on the
region as a whole, assessing both the positive and negative effects of the long-
distance trade upon Mweru-Tanganyika and the peoples who lived there. Andrew
Roberts suggested that, in order to sustain long-distance trade, older patterns of
production and exchange were transformed.105 The chapter will therefore end with a
discussion of the transformation of the traditional methods of exchange in East-
Central Africa.
2.1 Ivory and Slaves and the Long-Distance Trade
Most historians who have written about the East African long-distance trade agree
that ivory and slaves were the most highly sought-after items of trade among coastal
traders in the interior.106 Cameron even went so far as to say that in the mid-1870s,
the time of his trans-continental Central Africa journey, only slaves, ivory and, to a
lesser extent, rubber were exported overseas in large quantities.107 Sheriff insists
that it is essential that the two commodities be examined in conjunction with one
another. Indeed, so deeply intertwined were the slave trade and the legitimate
trade in ivory that the absence of one threatened the continuing success of the
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other.108 Their interconnectedness was no less obvious to contemporary observers,
as the title of this chapter shows. In February 1867, upon his arrival at the village of
the Bemba chief, Mwamba, Livingstone was asked what items he was interested in
trading. Surprised to hear that the explorer refused to be involved in trading ivory or
slaves, the Bemba chief had retorted: What do you wish to buy, if not slaves or
ivory?109
Before embarking on the combined analysis of these two commercial items, a
fundamental idea must be established. Slaves must be understood as part of what
Pier Larson calls a spectrum of trade and as just another article of commerce and
not an exception in world history.110 By this, Larson suggests that it is important not
to approach the slave trade from a moral standpoint. On the contrary, the economics
of the era must be appraised objectively, treating a slave as one would treat a tusk of
ivory or a load of salt. After all, this was how the slave traders themselves viewed
slaves, as the explorer Richard Burton understood well. Referring to the stockpiling
of export goods in the depots of coastal in the interior, he reported matter-of-factly
that slaves were collected like ivory.111
It is undeniably difficult to remain emotionally detached from a trade that saw
hundreds of thousands of innocent people captured and sold as items of commerce,
but this was the reality of the Arab-Swahili long-distance economy. Coastal traders
were not slave raiding and trading out of a personal hatred towards black Africans or
due to the tenets of their Islamic faith; they were businessmen, unrestrained by
moral and religious considerations when it came to supplying a particular demand in
the market that would lead to substantial profits if they were able to supply it.112 Ivory
and slaves were simply two of these in-demand items, both relatively easily available
in the African interior to the coastal traders. As Decle put it, the Arab may not be
perfect, but in business matters he is no fool.113
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Many contemporary European observers were insistent upon the evils of the Arab-
Swahili as vicious and unscrupulous slave traders, devoted to the cause of
depopulating the African interior. For example, Alfred Swann wrote of the Arabs,
These lazy, slave-depraved people were, I felt positive, many degrees below
the primitive, half-savage tribes of the Interior, amongst whom we were about
to live. Mohammedanism had done little for them except to make them
consider the Creator their special Protector, and the vast multitudes of the
natives their legitimate prey, ranking them about on an equality with the
animals of the forest.114
The German explorer and colonial administrator, Hermann von Wissmann also held
strong anti-Arab-Swahili sentiments and wrote that,
(The Arab-Swahili focus on) obtaining as many slaves as possible, never
caring what will ultimately become of the devastated countries. The fault of
originating these outrages lies unquestionably with the Arab, for only his
initiative made it possible to advance, to subjugate, and to depopulate more
and more.115
However, it is now widely believed by historians that the primary focus of coastal
caravans was ivory.116 Historically, ivory in much of the Central African interior was
an item of little commercial value or interest. It was gathered by chiefs and village
headmen as symbols of nobility through tribute from their subordinates and also as a
by-product of hunting for food, but it never really entered the regional trade networks
that existed before the arrival of coastal traders.117 This was soon to change as a
result of the rapidly growing demand for ivory in India, Europe and America
throughout the early 1800s for use in all manner of items, from billiard balls to piano
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keys.118 This demand also spurred Arab-Swahili traders to venture west into the
African interior for the first time, according to Sheriff and Edward A. Alpers.119
Arguably, the emerging demand for large quantities of ivory was the catalyst for
Arab-Swahili trade in the East African interior during the early nineteenth century.
Larson argues that Ivory became the main driver of export commerce, not
slaves.120 Zanzibar was soon known for exporting the best ivory in the world and the
ivory was quickly categorised into three different types, based upon quality and
destination.121 The best and most expensive ivory was sent east to India, whilst that
of middling quality went to Europe and America. Finally, the remaining tusks of the
poorest quality were sold to any destination where there was a market for them.
Alpers claimed that over 50% of all ivory exports were reaching the Indian
subcontinent by the middle of the century.122
In addition, he suggested that as much as 250,000 lbs of ivory left Zanzibar in 1856
and double that amount the following year.123 Such was the demand for ivory exports
that, according to Musambachime, a relay system of Nyamwezi caravans developed,
shuttling ivory from the interior to the coast, before returning west for another load.124
However, this rampant commercial exploitation of Central Africas animal resources
soon led to the rapid decline of elephant herds in the hinterland of Zanzibar and a
corresponding expansion of Arab-Swahili operations westwards to such regions
where ivory still remained plentiful. In the late 1850s, Burton reported a shift by
coastal traders to the west of Lake Tanganyika as the elephant herds on the eastern
shore dwindled due to extensive hunting.125 A decade later, Livingstone explained
the Arab-Swahili inroads into Manyema by pointing out the wealth of the eastern
Congo when compared to the territory further east. This shift was also driven by
ever-increasing prices at Zanzibar, as well as the aforementioned declining elephant
populations nearer to the coast.126 Cameron also noticed the steadily declining
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elephant herds during his trip through Ufipa and Ulungu on Lake Tanganyikas
south-east and southern shoreline in the early 1870s.127
By the time of Thomsons expedition in the final years of the 1870s, ivory stocks
were reaching dangerously low levels between the Swahili coast and Lake
Tanganyika.
The fact that the trade in ivory  now almost entirely depends on the distant
countries to which these routes lead, suggests a woeful tale of destruction.
Twenty years ago the countries between Tanganyika and the coast were rich
in ivory  Now these countries are completely despoiled  hardly a tusk is to
be got.128
Thomson did not see a single elephant during the eighteen months he spent in
Central Africa on this trip. The areas that Livingstone had visited a decade before
were empty of the elephants that once thrived there. The ivory trade was still
ongoing, but, according to Thomson, had certainly reached its turning-point. Each
year less ivory will be got.129
Drawing on the observations of Thomson and others, Andrew Roberts believes that
the Tanganyikan elephant population had plummeted by 1879. At the same time,
prices at the coast were skyrocketing, encouraging the trade even further. Despite
these ravages, the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor, and the Mweru-wa-Ntipa swamp
system in particular, remained a rich source of ivory, with elephants able to remain
undisturbed in the more impenetrable areas of the marshland.130
Harry Johnston, first Commissioner of the B.C.A.P., was also concerned by the
depopulation of elephants in the regions he was responsible for. In 1894, he wrote at
length on the subject to the Foreign Secretary Archibald Primrose, Earl of Rosebery.
While he conceded that ivory remained very common in the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor, he was still set upon preserving the elephant and rhinoceros although not
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the hippopotamus.131 However, this was not an act of early altruistic conservation
and, as with most actions taken by Johnston, it had an ulterior motive. Johnston
aimed to regulate the ivory trade so as to continue it for as long as possible,
maximising the benefit to the British Empire and the B.C.A.P., with himself as
Commissioner. He wrote as much in the aforementioned report to the Earl of
Rosebery,
(If) guns and gunpowder are) kept from the natives, especially from the Arabs,
and Europeans are only allowed to shoot elephants by taking out a license,
the elephant is likely to exist with us for all time, and yet to supply a
sufficiency of ivory for the trade.132
Having examined the key structural aspects of the ivory trade, the next step is to
analyse the Arab-Swahili slave trade. The link between ivory and slaves as
commercial items has already been established, but the reason behind this will now
be explored. Those European observers who were not blind to all trade except that
of slaves, frequently noted that ivory was the focus of the Arab-Swahili traders in the
interior and that slaves were a subsidiary item. Decle, for one, wrote that The Arab
is mainly an ivory merchant, and this is the only business that really pays him; in a
similar vein, Livingstone had remarked that Those Arabs who despair of ivory invest
their remaining beads and cloth in slaves.133
However, the slave trade cannot be simply relegated to a subordinate position
without due examination. Whilst the acquisition of ivory was undoubtedly the main
concern of coastal traders, slaves were not simply taken or bought on impulse or
because a trader still had trade goods left over from the stock he had brought with
him. There was a definite demand for slaves at the coast and they served a vital role
in many caravans returning from the interior. As Cameron explains, the entire long-
distance trade was based upon porterage.134 Without dedicated porters, a coastal
trader, no matter how distinguished, was not able to transport the commodities he
had bought, collected and hunted, back to the coast. Slaves often fulfilled this role,
carrying ivory to the coast where, upon their arrival, both they and their cargo were
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sold. The Echoes of Service described with disgust how, despite ivory maintaining its
position as the chief export of Central Africa, thousands of people were still being
enslaved to carry the tusks to the coast. This solved the persistent and difficult issue
of logistics for those coastal traders who did not wish to hire professional porters,
such as the Nyamwezi.135 Johnston, too, understood the close relationship that
existed between slaves and porterage: the Arab-Swahilis one idea, he wrote to the
Earl of Rosebery was to amass enough property in slaves or ivory or both  the
former to carry the latter.136
Thomson was equally convinced that the traffic in slaves alone would never repay
the traders, the main value of the slaves simply being that they act as unpaid
carriers.137
The obvious link between ivory and slaves as commercial items in the long-distance
trade presented here shows the impracticality for traders of attempting to focus on
either item to the exclusion of the other. Ivory profits could be maximised by using
slave porterage rather than paying professional porters, and slave trading without the
sale of ivory was commercially unviable for traders and far too risky, especially once
the Europeans had established some bridgeheads in the interior. Somewhat
jingoistically, Burton suggested that the only way in which the ivory trade would
become profitable in the absence of the slave trade would be through a great
improvement in logistics and conveyance that only Europeans could bring.138
The development of the East-Central African slave trade itself must now be
examined, including both the more famous Indian Ocean/East Coast oceanic slave
trade and the thoroughly under examined internal slave trade within the African
continent itself. Sheriff claims that at the beginning of the nineteenth century the
slave trade in East-Central Africa was very small.139 However, he also shows that the
trade then grew rapidly in size and severity, to the point that the British felt it
necessary to pressurise the Sultan of Zanzibar, Barghash bin Said Al-Busaid, to sign
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a joint treaty in 1873 aimed at suppressing the slave trade on the east coast.140
Musambachime suggests that the ever-increasing demand for slaves, and constantly
improving organisation of the Arab-Swahili caravans, created a cycle of demand, in
turn encouraging an improved supply. According to Musambachime, the
corresponding increase in supply then fuelled even greater demand.141
Alpers agrees with both Sheriffs and Musambachimes assessments, suggesting
that the rapid growth of the eastern slave trade took place in the first half of the
nineteenth century, partly in response to attempts to curb the trade elsewhere on the
African continent.
The Indian Ocean slave trade resembled the infamous Atlantic slave trade in that it
removed African slaves from the continent by ship, destined for European colonies
or other territories around the world. Slaves were exported from the East African
coast to the European-owned islands of the Indian Ocean, such as the Seychelles,
Mauritius and Madagascar, or even around the Cape of Good Hope and west across
the Atlantic to South America to the Portuguese colonies in Brazil, for example.
Whilst still being somewhat marginalised by historians in comparison to its Atlantic
counterpart, the Indian Ocean slave trade has been studied far more than the
second type of slave trade in East Africa, namely the internal slave trade. This latter
trade saw African slaves never leave the continent; instead they were employed on
plantations and farms on Zanzibar or the Swahili coast and owned by the same
Arab-Swahili traders who had brought them to the coast from their homes in the
interior in the first place.142
In addition, it is important to remember that the Arab-Swahili were not the only slave
trading peoples in Central Africa during the nineteenth-century. As its name
suggests, the internal slave trade was a socio-economic institution of the continents
interior and saw many African peoples intimately involved in it. By no means did
every slave in the internal trade pass into the hands of the Arab-Swahili traders to be
put to work in the plantations of the coast. In fact, many simply passed between the
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different peoples of the African interior, often with very limited or no Arab-Swahili
involvement at all.
A prime example of this is related by Lary and Wright when they describe how
famines struck several of the peoples around Lake Tanganyika during the second
half of the nineteenth-century. The Lungu were one such group who resorted to
trading their own people as slaves for food from their more productive neighbours,
the Fipa. Somewhat ironically, the Fipa were importing slaves to work their extensive
gardens and farms producing the food that they then exported out of their country.
This led to the intriguing scenario where enslaved Lungu were put to work cultivating
food for their new masters, only for the fruits of their labour to be sold back to their
own villages and chiefs, in exchange for more slaves to work Fipa lands.143 This is
but one example of the internal slave trade between indigenous African peoples, free
of coastal trader interference, which occurred across the African continent in the
nineteenth-century.
The internal slave trade also saw slaves used as what effectively amounted to
currency by the Arab-Swahili traders. The traders would act as middle-men, using
slaves as an item of exchange with African peoples, such as the Fipa, who sought to
import slaves rather than export them. In addition, slaves were used as payment to
those employed as porters or guards in the coastal traders long-distance
caravans.144 These mercenary dependents, such as the Nyamwezi, existed through
a combination of subsistence agriculture for half the year and paid employment by
the Arab-Swahili traders for the other half. Therefore, owning slaves allowed
commercially-minded African peoples to work their lands at home, whilst still being
available for the wage labour of porterage for the coastal traders.145
As Melvin Page suggests, slaves were an economic institution for the Arab-Swahili in
this region of Central Africa. However, from the examples of the internal slave trade
detailed above, slaves seemed to occupy a similar position in the societies of the
African peoples of the interior as in that of the traders.146 Slaves were the original
labour-saving device, allowing their owners to maximise their profits. It was far
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cheaper to use slaves rather than to employ labourers to carry out menial tasks and
subsistence agriculture.
In order to remedy the marginalisation of the internal slave trade of Africa, it is
necessary to examine the estimates of the number of slaves suggested to have been
involved. Also, it is essential not to disregard a whole facet of the African slave trade
simply because it is less visible in historical records. As Larson writes The internal
slave trade of Africa was the oldest and likely the greatest in magnitude.147
Therefore, approaching the internal trade numerically, Larson suggests that when
the nineteenth century alone is considered, the Indian Ocean trade was almost six
times smaller than the internal trade in terms of the numbers of slaves involved. He
estimates that some 1.1 million slaves were exported from the East Coast between
1801 and 1901, but nearly 6.2 million were involved in the internal trade across this
same period.148 Alpers estimate that every year 15,000 slaves were entering the
plantation economy on Zanzibar alone, not including the plantations and farms on
neighbouring islands such as Pemba or the Swahili coast, demonstrates the
enormity in scale of the internal slave trade in East Africa.149
Whilst having largely escaped the attention of modern historians, coeval observers
were alive to the importance of the internal slave trade. Decle was one such
nineteenth-century commentator who made the distinction between the two forms of
the slave trade in East Africa. He wrote,
On this question of slavery we must make a fundamental distinction. Slave-
raiding by Arab adventurers in the interior is one thing, while domestic slavery
in the settled districts, where the Arabs have made themselves permanent
homes, is quite another.150
Despite his decidedly modern approach to understanding the differing forms of the
slave trade, Decle seriously underestimated the size of the domestic trade. He
expounded where I differ from the Anti-Slavery Society is that I do not for a moment
believe that the slave trade in the interior is of anything like the proportions they
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allege it to be.151 However, Decles position is easily explained by his own estimates
of slave export as he travelled throughout Central Africa in the early 1890s. He
suggested that nearly 2 million slaves had been taken by Arab-Swahili traders in the
18 months that had preceded his arrival, with another 500,000 killed in the
process.152 Decle assumed that these slaves were intended for export in the oceanic
slave trade; yet, it was more likely, particularly when the European anti-slavery
operations in East Africa in the 1880s and 1890s are considered, that they were
destined for coastal plantations belonging to Arab-Swahili traders, having never left
the continent. Decle concluded by making the point that trying to end the internal
slave trade would prove considerably more difficult than ending the oceanic slave
trades.153
Slaves from the Mweru-Tanganyika region certainly entered both forms of the slave
trade.154 Johnston claimed that the B.C.A.P. and British Sphere of Influence
contributed the main supply of slaves to the East Coast traders and that the part of
Africa most frequented by slavers was the eastern half of British Central Africa.155
Johnston suggested that only 10% of the slaves annually leaving the protectorate
were destined for overseas plantations and, of these, 80% were sent to Madagascar.
Only 2% of exported slaves reached the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf by his
reckoning and he proudly proclaimed that the trans-marine slave trade is nearly at
an end from Eastern and Southern Central Africa.156 However, Johnston later
tempered this statement of success by confirming the existence and scale of the
internal slave trade in East Africa.
By far the bulk of the slaves obtained from Central Africa south of the equator
are destined for the coast plantations. The centre of the continent is being
depopulated for the benefit of the East Coast region. The numerous Arabs
and Swahili planters require docile manual labour for their increasingly
profitable plantations, and naturally obtain this, not from the sturdy and semi-
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civilised tribes around them, but from the more docile savages of the
Interior.157
Having discussed the scale of the East African slave trade, both external and internal
in the nineteenth century, other facets of the slave trade must be explored: including
the origins of the slaves, the methods of enslavement and the work that the slaves
were intended for.
The Arab-Swahili slave traders were far more prominent in regions whose peoples
could only offer disorganised and weaker opposition. Peoples with less centralised
governments and little military organisation were preyed upon extensively. It is
because of this that areas such as the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor were particularly
badly affected. The region around Lake Tanganyika was what Thomson called the
centre of the slave trade; while Burton chillingly claimed that all the tribes from the
eastern equatorial coast to Ujiji and the regions lying westward of the Tanganyika
Lake may be called slave-races.158 Larson sums up the geographical extent of the
trade well when he describes the heaviest concentrations of slaves coming from both
shores of Lake Tanganyika, the Lualaba River basin in the Congo and the Nyamwezi
highlands near Tabora.159
The slave trade was particularly prevalent and damaging in the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor due to the political landscape of the region during this period. As already
discussed in the introduction of this thesis, the Corridor contained a number of
different peoples and cultures forced into close proximity with one another due to the
physical geography of the region. The lowland lakeshores of Mweru and Tanganyika
and the interlaying swamp system had great agricultural potential as well as large
animal populations and deposits of salt and iron. This naturally drew many
subsistence peoples to the region, such as the Tabwa, Lungu and Mambwe, but also
attracted more militaristic groups, such as the Bemba of the highland plateaus to the
south, who survived primarily by raiding neighbouring groups and conquering the
more fertile lands of others. Naturally, the Corridor was a prime target for these
raiders.
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It was into this system of constant rivalry and warfare that the Arab-Swahili
penetrated, bringing with them their desire for slaves.160 Not only was the region
comparatively densely populated compared to the highlands closer to the east coast,
but it was also riven with internal discord between neighbouring peoples, clans and
villages and surrounded by strong, predatory, militaristic groups who could provide a
supply of the commodities that the coastal traders had come in search of. Therefore,
it is clear to see why the slave trade was so destructive in Mweru-Tanganyika. The
region lacked strong, central leadership to repel the intruders; its population was
scattered and renowned for its civil wars and conflicts, and, with the advent of
coastal penetration, it had several marauding groups who were intent upon
depopulating it for their own economic gain.
Slaves were generally obtained through violent means, such as kidnapping and
raiding.161 These resulted in huge collateral damage and Decles estimate of half a
million dead for 2 million enslaved may not be far from the truth during a period that
saw particularly violent raids in the interior. Local wars were also a good source of
slaves for the Arab-Swahili and traders often involved themselves in these conflicts
with the aim of enslaving large numbers of captives. Therefore, in general, slaves
were prisoners, either from wars or raiding. However, criminals, debtors and even
sometimes particularly unlucky political opponents or thwarted pretenders found
themselves sold to passing coastal caravans as slaves.
The Arab-Swahili were not the sole protagonists of the slave trade and many other
groups sold slaves that they had gathered either in war or through raids of their own.
The Nyamwezi and Bemba were two such groups, although they were certainly not
the only African peoples involved in the trade.162 Johnston described the situation in
the B.C.A.P. thus,
There are some tribes which are almost entirely victims of the slave trade,
there are other tribes which enslave their neighbours and sell their own
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superfluous people as well, and there are certain races  with whom it had
almost become a national profession to sell the people of other tribes.163
Johnston claimed that the Arab-Swahili were the backbone of the slave trade and,
without them, groups such as the Nyamwezi would soon be reduced to a condition
of law and order. History soon proved Johnston to be correct in these estimations,
but the militant anti-slavery operations by European colonial powers probably proved
more of a disincentive to such groups than the simple absence of Arab-Swahili
traders in the interior did.164 However, it would be a mistake to assume that just
because the Arab-Swahili slave trade was nearing its end, that the end of the internal
exchange of slaves in the region was also nigh.
Finally, the uses to which the slaves were put once they reached their destinations
will be discussed. Those slaves involved in the Indian Ocean slave trade in the
nineteenth-century found themselves used in a very similar way to the Atlantic
slaves. They were sold to plantations and made to work to produce exotic goods for
the markets of the western world. On the Indian Ocean islands these plantations
grew spices and herbs, such as cinnamon and vanilla, whilst in the Americas the
dominant crops were sugar and cotton. In the interior of Africa a similar fate awaited
the slaves. Agricultural and plantation work on the coast and Zanzibari islands
consumed most of the slaves of the internal trade, as they required vast amounts of
labour. The crops grown would often be very similar to those on the Indian Ocean
islands, but could also include fruit, sugar, papyrus, rice and cereal crops. These
were grown, harvested and then sold at the coastal markets, providing far safer and
more guaranteed profits for retired long-distance Arab-Swahili traders than the
caravan trips of their youth.165
Slaves also found themselves doing any number of menial jobs around Arab-Swahili
settlements that a poor freeman may very well have been expected to do.
Musambachime examines these professions closely in his biography of the trader
Nshimba and attempts to provide an exhaustive list of them. Slaves were employed
in the fishing industry that was prominent on the coast and Zanzibari islands, either
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fishing or working in the associated processing industries, readying the fish for
market. Some were put to work as smiths, masons, jewellers and miners if they
already had experience of such industries from their past lives.166 Many Mambwe
and Nyamwezi slaves found themselves in this role, with both peoples being
regionally renowned for their ironworking. However, it was not just laborious physical
tasks that slaves were used for by their Arab-Swahili masters. Some were weavers,
tailors and cobblers, others were musicians and entertainers, and the most trusted
slaves were even found in the medical profession or as religious teachers (mullahs)
to the Muslim faithful of the Swahili coast. Generally, the more skilled a slave the
better they were treated, being given better food and treatment in return for their
services and their embracement of the coastal culture.167
Many of the slaves effectively became a human currency in the Arab-Swahili world,
especially by the second half of the nineteenth century. Andrew Roberts suggests
that many were simply held for future transactions, passing from one master to
another as deals were brokered between different trading interests amongst the
coastal traders.168 Some were even used for military purposes and armed and used
as slave-soldiers in caravans that ventured into the interior.169 These ruga-ruga
stood the best chance of self-improvement and promotion of any slave as they
sometimes found themselves chosen to lead caravans if they had performed
admirably and proved themselves trustworthy on past expeditions. Many of the
famous coastal traders that will be examined below began their careers as lowly
ruga-ruga.
In summary, it is clear that the growth and development of the Arab-Swahili long-
distance trade from small, relatively weak, individual traders to the thousands-strong
caravans of Tippu Tip and his contemporaries, in turn drove the trade in both ivory
and slaves. The stimulation of new commodities, as mercantilism itself grows, is a
pattern that punctuates global trade throughout history and it was no different in
East-Central Africa during the nineteenth-century. The demand for ivory and slaves
encouraged greater penetration of the African interior by coastal traders, which in
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turn further stimulated the demand for the commodities that the Arab-Swahili were
able to supply in increasing amounts. They were simply businessmen in a perfect
position to exploit the in-demand resources of the interior to their own benefit and to
the cost of the unfortunate peoples, animals and land of East-Central Africa.
2.2 Other Commodities of the Arab-Swahili Long-Distance Trade
Ivory and slaves were not the only commercial items of the Arab-Swahili long-
distance trade and, as Pier Larson suggests, were simply a portion of Africas
foreign trade  (with the) domestic economies of Africa  far more important in a
quantitative sense.170 In other words, focussing on the main exports that were
leaving the continent in the hands of the coastal traders must not be at the expense
of the examination of internal African commerce. The Arab-Swahili trade was not
bound to specific products; but rather driven solely by profit. Coastal traders were
ready to supply any lucrative commercial demand and, therefore, many different
items were traded by the Arab-Swahili, ranging from the cloth and beads that they
brought from the coast, to natural resources such as salt and copper, that were
produced and traded regionally long before the long-distance trade ever reached the
countries of the deep interior of the African continent.
Sheriff claims that by 1875 the hinterland of Zanzibar stretched halfway across the
African continent and that the penetration of traders into regions so far west was only
possible thanks to the pre-existing regional networks of commercial exchange.171
These networks traded items that were very different to those desired by the world
markets that the Arab-Swahili traders sought to supply.172 If this fact is combined
with Sheriffs estimate that 80% of all exports leaving Zanzibar during the nineteenth
century came from the mainland, and many of these from deep within the interior of
Central Africa, it is obvious that the coastal traders found themselves drawn into, and
helped to expand, pre-existing local and regional commercial networks.173
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This involvement provided a whole new dynamic to networks of exchange and the
coastal traders helped to both expand the reach of these regional trade networks
and to bring East-Central Africa into the global economy. In addition, the Arab-
Swahili trade encouraged both production and commerce within Africa itself.174 In
other words, there was a synthesis between long-distance and local regional trade,
with both acting to stimulate the other. Local produce was carried much further by
the Arab-Swahili traders and local peoples benefited from the new customers that
came in the form of these coastal caravans.175 This is particularly apparent in the
growth of industries based entirely upon supplying passing Arab-Swahili caravans
with food and other necessary provisions.176
Prior to its penetration by the Arab-Swahili, the regional trade networks of the Central
Africa interior involved little in the way of professional organisation.177 They relied
heavily upon some of the most basic of all the natural resources found in Mweru-
Tanganyika and elsewhere, such as salt, iron and copper. These were
geographically dispersed throughout the region and, understandably, the peoples
who possessed a ready supply of the resources traded them with those who lacked
them. The arrival of the Arab-Swahili traders in the nineteenth century only
encouraged and expanded these networks of exchange, and the coastal traders
applied themselves enthusiastically to the business of trading the valuable natural
resources of the region.
Salt was the most important of these commercial natural resources in the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor and had been so since the earliest days of human settlement
between these two Central African lakes.178 Both R.J. Moore and St John estimate
that the regional salt trade properly began in the eighteenth-century, and it was well-
established by 1800.179 The essential nature of salt for subsistence farmers and
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hunter-fishermen cannot be underestimated and, therefore, the trade was necessary
for their continued existence. This trade resulted in the establishment of both direct
and indirect connections between peoples of the region.180
The sheer number of different peoples reliant upon salt in their everyday lives during
this period shows the importance of both its production and trade. The Bwile of Lake
Mweru and the Tabwa of the Corridor famously produced salt near Tshitope, Puta,
Kalembwe, Pende, Chiengi and Kaputa and sold it to traders from Katanga and the
Coast.181 It was reaching the hands of Nyamwezi throughout the nineteenth century
and is known to have entered Arab-Swahili circles as a commercial item by the
1830s.182 Salt from the Corridor reached the Bemba at Mporokoso and Kasama, the
Mambwe, the Lungu, and the Aushi at Fort Rosebery.
It was even reportedly present as far away as Ujiji, Lake Nyasa and Lunda capitals
to the west by the 1860s.183 Livingstone himself had traded salt during his time in the
region and Trivier and Giraud witnessed the Bemba-Nyamwezi trade in salt in the
late 1880s.184 In 1889, Trivier also reportedly saw the Arab-Swahili trader Teleka,
who was based at Sumbu on the Tanganyikan shoreline, transporting an entire
caravans worth of salt to trade for slaves rather than the more usual cloth from the
coast.185 By 1894, Daniel Crawford of the Plymouth Brethren mission in Central
Africa was convinced that the best salt in the region came from the salt pans of the
Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and claimed that a porter carrying 40 lbs of Mweru salt
could trade it with the African Lakes Company at Abercorn for 40 yards of calico
cloth.186 This quite clearly shows the commercial potential of salt, even into the final
decade of the nineteenth century, and how it remained a central part of trade for
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European companies even after the effective destruction of the Arab-Swahili
presence in the interior.
Salt was particularly vital to the peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor as the
land itself was not productive enough for subsistence agriculture alone. Despite
groups such as the Tabwa best being described as agriculturalists, according to
Giacomo Macola, Moore and St John, they relied upon the export of salt and other
produce to buy crops and livestock and thus sustain themselves. They were part-
time specialists according to St John, farming until the salt season (mid-June-
November), when they produced the commodity whose exchange would sustain the
village until the next salt season came around.187 One bad year could see the village
starve during the rainy season between January and March. Salt became gradually
less desirable and more difficult to transport profitably, leading the Tabwa in
particular to carry salt to the markets themselves.188
It is obvious from this analysis of salt as a commercial item in the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor that it was very important to everyone involved in its production and trade. It
was an essential item for peoples throughout Central Africa who required it to store
food effectively. Its geographic dispersal meant that networks of exchange naturally
developed between peoples who enjoyed ready access to this all-important resource
and people who did not. In Mweru-Tanganyika this network of exchange was
assisted by the need for local peoples to import foodstuffs, their own land being
relatively infertile. Later in the nineteenth century, the involvement of Arab-Swahili
and European traders saw salt develop from a local item of exchange to one that
travelled thousands of miles upon the backs of porters in the Arab-Swahili caravans.
Mineral ores, such as copper, iron and gold, and the items made from them were
also very important commercial items in East-Central Africa during the nineteenth
century. In many ways, these resources and their uses, both commercial and in
everyday life, match the trajectory of salt, as described above. These resources were
all essential for the peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika region and hugely desirable as
items of trade for the Arab-Swahili and Europeans. They were also as geographically
dispersed as salt, meaning that those with a supply of the mineral ores were able to
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trade them, whilst simultaneously developing their metalworking skills, with those
groups who did not possess the ores and yet still needed metal goods.
Iron is almost always mentioned in the same breath as salt when contemporary
European commentators and modern-day African historians write of the commercial
items of Mweru-Tanganyika.189 It was similar in many regards, being geographically
dispersed in several main deposits and being a resource essential to all the peoples
of the region, whether they had a readily available supply or not. However,
unprocessed iron ore alone had little commercial value, and it was the working of
iron and production of tools, weapons and other ironware that made iron
economically desirable as a resource. Therefore, peoples with an extensive supply
of iron often became renowned and respected as particularly good smiths, smelters
and ironworkers.190
The most famous peoples known for their ironworking around the Mweru-Tanganyika
region were the Mambwe, Lungu and Fipa, all of whom had extensive iron deposits
in the heartland of their countries.191 Livingstone witnessed the Lungu iron industry
as he passed through the area in 1873, mentioned many mines and furnaces and
described how the hoes, axes and spears that the Lungu produced were traded
south with the Bemba.192 The Mambwe were also famed as smiths. Their large iron
deposits enabled them to become known as some of the premier weapon-makers in
the region, be it axes and spears or arrowheads.193 They also traded their ironware
extensively with passing Arab-Swahili caravans who often stopped among them en
route to Kazembe and Katanga.194 Finally, the Fipa between Lake Tanganyika and
Lake Rukwa were renowned for having the strongest iron industry of any people in
the region. They had abundant supplies of iron ore and even had access to
limestone to remove the impurities in the iron during the smelting process.195
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Iron, or rather iron goods, were obviously an essential item for all of the different
peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika region. Iron tools and weapons were in great
demand and, therefore, traded extensively between groups such as the Mambwe
and Lungu and those who needed weapons, such as the Bemba. Also, ironworkers
soon transferred their skills across to working on damaged firearms, which led to
increased interaction between them and both Arab-Swahili traders and European
colonial authorities.196 In many ways, the skills of ironworking were more of a
commercial item than the iron goods themselves.
The final mineral ore to be discussed is copper. St John writes that copper could
have been the very first commercially traded item in Mweru-Tanganyika, Katanga
and the Luapula River valley. He continues by suggesting that the trade in copper
predated the growing demand for ivory and as a commodity it was already heading
west to the Lunda paramounts and east to the mercantile peoples of Mweru-
Tanganyika before the Arab-Swahili ever penetrated the interior.
Later in the nineteenth century both coastal traders and the Nyamwezi still smelted
and brought copper on their trading caravans to trade with Kazembe, the Bemba
Chitimukulu and other regional paramounts.197 This early importance of copper in the
Arab-Swahili trade is confirmed by Said bin Habib, Moore and Joseph Moloney.198
Said bin Habib, for example, recounted that copper is taken for sale all over the
country.199
Andrew Roberts also points out that during the nineteenth century there were direct
caravans from the Swahili coast to Katanga specifically for the acquisition of
copper.200 Burton saw the importance of copper for the Arab-Swahili traders when he
visited Ujiji in the late 1850s. He specifically mentioned Katangese copper being
plentiful at the towns markets and that a trade route for copper existed across Lake
Tanganyika, through the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and west into Katanga.201
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Katanga was renowned for its high quality copper and some of the first Arab-Swahili
caravans heading west into the interior had that region as their ultimate target.
However, what truly catapulted copper into its position of economic prominence
during the nineteenth century was the penetration of the mineral-rich region of
Katanga by Msiri and his Nyamwezi followers, the Yeke.202 This represents one of
the first examples of traders settling permanently in the interior and taking control of
the production of a particular commercial item for their own benefit. Msiris rule had
many negative effects on the region as a whole and it could be argued that he
introduced a predatory style of politics whose significance has endured to this day.
Large amounts of Katangese copper were made into jewellery or wire, with the
Tabwa, Lungu, Mambwe, Nyiha and Nyakyusa peoples all commonly wearing
copper wire by the late 1870s.203 It was in the latter form that copper became of
central importance to trade in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor. Throughout the
nineteenth century, copper wire was as much a form of currency for the coastal
traders and peoples of the interior as European imports, such as cloth and beads,
were. It was an item that could be easily carried by traders, kept its value and
remained undamaged and untarnished across long periods of time. For these
reasons, it was a perfect medium of exchange in a trade whose greatest challenge
was the transportation of goods across vast distances. Copper was in many ways
the perfect commercial item and should be recognised for its role as the facilitator of
a great deal of other trade in the interior during this period.
Having examined the local natural resources traded in the Mweru-Tanganyika region
during the nineteenth century, the two most important trade goods imported by the
Arab-Swahili caravans, namely cloth and bead, will be discussed.204
As described above in the analysis of the copper trade, cloth and beads effectively
amounted to units of currency for Arab-Swahili traders in the African interior. Andrew
Roberts suggests a tentative estimate of four yards of calico being equal to a load of
salt, a slave or a piece of ironware during the second half of the nineteenth-
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century.205 However, he also admits that the value of cloth and beads did fluctuate
regularly, depending on the current fashions and desires in Central Africa.206
Some cloth was produced by the various African peoples of the interior, and it is
probable that this entered the regional trade networks previously discussed. Said bin
Habib recounted cloth being made in Katanga with the abundant cotton supply
during his visit in the 1840s and Willis writes of how the area between Lake
Tanganyika and Lake Rukwa was a well-known centre of weaving, producing good
quality cloth that was worn by many in the region.207
Larson is of the opinion that historians have not devoted sufficient attention to the
role of cloth in trade throughout Central Africa during this period. He claims that it
was a vitally important method of purchase for the Arab-Swahili traders and played a
significant role in the appropriation of slaves for the oceanic trades of the Indian and
Atlantic oceans. The most important and popular type of imported cloth was the
American cotton cloth produced in New England, often referred to as Merikani in the
Mweru-Tanganyika region and made famous by the Arab-Swahili trader, Juma bin
Salim wad Rakad who was famously dubbed Juma Merikani for the vast amounts of
this cloth that he traded. It proved to be increasingly popular amongst many African
peoples throughout the nineteenth century, reaching its zenith in the second half of
the century, which roughly corresponded to the height of the power of the coastal
traders in the interior.208
Beads were the lesser partner of the pair of imported goods commonly carried by the
Arab-Swahili into the African interior, with cloth generally taking precedence.
Obviously, beads had less physical uses than cloth did, but their small size and
durability in comparison to great rolls of material meant that generally every trader
would take at least a small amount with them on their safaris into the interior.209
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Beads became a form of currency for many in Mweru-Tanganyika during the
nineteenth-century as there was no coined money.210 The value of beads was
based upon the current trends in the region, which led to changing demands for
different varieties of beads.211 Masaro pipe-beads, for example, were hugely popular
in the area around Ujiji from the 1870s to the 1890s but in other areas beads of
many colours, sizes, and cultural connotations were desired by the African
population.212
Almost every major African people around the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor in the
nineteenth-century, from the Arab-Swahili traders to the Bemba and Lunda of
Kazembe, valued beads as a mercantile commodity.213 They were traded for all
kinds of other items, be it livestock, tobacco, pack mules or even canoes, as
Livingstone did.214 The African peoples would then incorporate them into their
everyday lives, with some of their stranger uses including being used to make Tabwa
hairpieces, memory boards or even as ingredients in magic and sorcery.215 Andrew
Roberts suggests that, whatever their use in the nineteenth-century, beads became
something of a Central African necessity, which only helped increase their attraction
as a commodity. 216
Cloth and beads were merely two of the many different Arab-Swahili imports.
However, they were two of the most important, and cloth, in particular, played a
pivotal role in the development of the long-distance trade. These trade goods were
essential for the Arab-Swahili traders to be able to initiate any form of exchange with
the chiefs and paramounts that they found in the interior that possessed stockpiles of
the resources for which there was a demand at the coast.
Imported goods also played an important role in the socio-political hierarchies of
many of the different peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika region. The exchange of
slaves, ivory and other resources of the African interior for imported goods, such as
cloth and beads, allowed chiefs and headmen to increase their own power and the
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size of their following. This all stems from the established fact that in much of pre-
colonial sub-Saharan Africa political power had more to do with the control of people
than land. With Africa being historically land-rich and people-poor, political
leaders needed people and supporters. By bringing into being networks of loyalties
and dependencies, the vertical distribution of imported goods was a key means of
achieving this aim. This, in turn, increased the power and wealth of chiefs, as more
tributary followers meant that they could obtain more ivory and other exportable
commodities. The imported goods that they obtained in exchange for these
commodities were then used to continuously attract more people to the chiefs in
question, thereby increasing their powerbase even further.
Finally, in any analysis of the long-distance trade in Central Africa, the production
and commercial exchange of food must be considered. Whether these foodstuffs
were the fish of the lakes and waterways of East-Central Africa, the herds of cattle
and goats of the highland plateaus or the huge variety of crops grown in the gardens
of the peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika, food represented one of the most important
items of production for any group of people in the region. It must be remembered
that the commercial, industrialised agricultural techniques of nineteenth-century
Europe and America were alien to the peoples of Central Africa and their level of
agrarian technology and techniques had more in common with the medieval peasant
farmers of Western Europe than the vast mechanised plantations of the USA. The
people of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor were subsistence farmers and therefore
the production of food was central to their very existence.
Insofar as the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor is concerned, the peoples of the region
kept livestock and grew a remarkable variety of crops, including; corn, manioc,
sorghum, beans, bananas, cauliflowers, onions, tomatoes, turnips, maize, peas,
sweet potatoes, coffee, sugar, sesame, pepper, rice, wheat, yams, cucumbers,
mushrooms, artichokes, millet, groundnuts, cassava, chillies, oranges, limes,
mangoes, spinach, pumpkins, lemons, apples, dates, pomegranates and cocoa.217
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However, despite this variety, the quantity of crops produced was insufficient to fully
sustain the inhabitants of the region. This forced local groups to rely upon the
regional export of other commercial items, such as iron and salt, to fully meet their
nutritional requirements.218 Easy access to large amounts of fish did help to offset
the lack of quality agrarian produce in Mweru-Tanganyika to a certain extent,219 but
fishing was a mainly seasonal activity and therefore could not be relied upon to feed
what was a relatively densely populated area.220
The keeping of livestock was also by no means a replacement source of food in
Mweru-Tanganyika during this period. As Andrew Roberts suggests, the peoples of
the region were almost exclusively agriculturalists, reliant upon crops, rather than
large herds and flocks.221 However, the Mambwe were the exception to this rule.
They were known as superb pastoralists and kept large herds of cattle and flocks of
goats, sheep, fowl and pigeons, greatly assisted in this endeavour by the excellent
pasture present in the heartland of their country.222 This proved to be something of a
double edged sword, as their animal wealth did not go unnoticed by surrounding
peoples who relied upon raiding and looting, as opposed to the more peaceful
farming methods of the Corridor peoples. The Ngoni constantly raided the Mambwe
heartland from their bases to the north-west of Lake Nyasa, drawn by the large
Mambwe herds up until 1870 when the Bemba were able to halt Ngoni incursions
into Mweru-Tanganyika.223 Far from bringing peace to the region, the Bemba in fact
replaced the Ngoni as raiders of the Mambwe herds, eventually leading to the
Mambwe paramount entering a tributary relationship with the northernmost Bemba
chiefs and headmen.224
The need to supplement locally-produced foodstuffs drew the peoples of Mweru-
Tanganyika into local commercial networks. These, as has already been pointed out,
long-predated the arrival of coastal traders. Mweru-Tanganyikans would trade what
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resources they had, be it copper, salt or iron, for crops, fish or livestock with their
more food-affluent neighbours, such as the Fipa.
However, this all changed with the arrival of Arab-Swahili caravans of ever
increasing size throughout the nineteenth century. Food production developed in the
region beyond a pure subsistence level for the very first time, with the passing
caravans demands for the most basic of supplies and provisions stimulating local
production, particularly that of food.225 Caravans needed food for hundreds, if not
thousands, of mouths and it all had to be bought en route so as not to limit the
amount of trade goods that could be carried into the interior by the Arab-Swahili
traders porters.226 This led to what Andrew Roberts has called an agricultural
revolution in Mweru-Tanganyika, with food produced specifically for sale to the
Arab-Swahili caravans, rather than simply to support the farmers village and
family.227
This revolution certainly had a mixed effect on the region as often occurs when
rapid and radical changes befall an age-old socio-economic and political system.
The need to improve the production of food to the extent that enough was made for
export did encourage the adoption of new, hardier and more productive crops, such
as rice, cassava and maize, which in the long run benefited the peoples of Mweru-
Tanganyika considerably.
However, the arrival and assimilation of large numbers of Arab-Swahili traders and
their slaves into the existing social hierarchy of the region caused many problems.
Firstly, neither of these groups produced any food in the region yet both consumed
considerable amounts, straining the already overburdened farmers, fishermen and
drovers. In addition, the coastal traders repeatedly weakened the productive
potential of Mweru-Tanganyika by enslaving and pressganging men to serve as
porters who otherwise would have been able to assist in the production of food in the
region. This had the unexpected impact of forcing peoples of the interior to rely upon
slave importation so as to have enough labour to effectively continue their
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agriculture. This reportedly occurred at the southern tip of Lake Tanganyika between
the Lungu and the Fipa, who used slaves as agricultural workers.228
2.3 The Effects of the Arab-Swahili Long-Distance Trade
The final section of this chapter will assess the impact of the coastal traders and the
long-distance trade upon the region. Andrew Roberts has suggested that a
transformation of older methods of exchange occurred, allowing the development of
the Arab-Swahili long-distance trade in Central Africa.229 Therefore, it is important to
understand the situation that existed prior to the penetration of coastal trader into the
interior.
In Nachitutis Gift, Gordon focuses upon the link between society, economy and
environment, perfectly encapsulating the interconnectedness of these three aspects
of pre-colonial Central African life. The earliest networks of exchange were based
almost entirely upon the commercialisation of resources, such as iron and salt,
owned by specific peoples rather than existing as common property.230 This
created a natural supply and demand relationship between those with access to the
resources and those without. As Gordon describes Rights in resources were always
a matter of power, exerted and enforced through available cultural, social, political,
and economic means and therefore wealth in pre-colonial Africa was measured
through social relationships, rather than by the ownership of property. 231
In other words, prior to the penetration of Central Africa by foreign traders,
commerce was more a process of social interaction than of economic transaction. A
rich chief in pre-colonial Africa would control important resources that he would
then distribute to his tributary headmen, and in return they would offer him their
allegiance. Ergo, that chief would become wealthy through the acquisition of
increased social control, but that wealth was based entirely upon social contexts. A
paramount chief was only rich as long as he maintained the social networks of
distribution of the resources he claimed to own. Gordon sums up this very idea
when he writes,
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Property is about power; rights in property, whether public or private, have to
be enforced, and the agencies of enforcement are always located in social
contexts. Individuals who claim ownership of resources cannot act
autonomously; their claims rely on social networks that act to support
resource rights.232
In simplified terms, what the penetration of the Arab-Swahili traders into the African
interior truly did was to drive a wedge into the carefully balanced socio-economic
networks of exchange and distribution that defined pre-colonial African commerce.
For the first time, wealth became measurable in physical terms through the amount
of property owned, and what the coastal traders had achieved was to introduce a
way for chiefs to ignore the social obligations of the traditional networks of exchange
and strike out alone by exploiting the resources that were previously protected by the
social networks of redistribution.233 For example, why would a chief ignore salt
deposits near his village that supposedly belonged to his overlord, when by
exploiting them himself he could gain wealth and power through interaction and trade
with the Arab-Swahili penetrating the interior of the continent?
This also led to the beginning of the overexploitation of the natural resources of the
region. As Thomson highlighted, the African continent was barely worked, aside from
the coasts and the hunting of elephants for ivory, and this, combined with the new
ideas regarding wealth acquisition introduced through East-Central Africas contact
with the global economy, gave many chiefs the idea to begin exploiting the natural
resources they found around them.234 Prior to the contact with the coastal traders
there would have been values and regulatory apparatus in place to stop the
overexploitation of these natural resources, but in the name of the maximisation of
profit and production these were quickly eroded.235
It might be expected that this move away from traditional social hierarchies and
power structures would have benefited the chiefs at the lower levels of society, with
their traditional overlords now removed and a degree of economic independence
established. However, the Arab-Swahili traders, whilst appearing initially beneficial,
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were actually able to stimulate resource production by the peoples of the interior and
then monopolise the essential position of entrepreneur in the network. The
indigenous locals of Mweru-Tanganyika were denied the chance to professionalise
from their subsistence level of commerce and never developed into the middlemen in
the trade, a position that would have seen them reap the benefits of the exploitation
of their natural resources that they deserved.236
The advent of European colonialism sealed the door upon any potential for
indigenous Africans to take up the middleman role they longed for. They had seen a
potential opening with the removal of Arab-Swahili power from the African interior by
the European powers, only for the great commercial corporations of Europe to
sweep in and continue from where the coastal traders had left off before their
demise.237 All that was left for the Africans was the adaptation of old trade skills to
the newly introduced industries of the modern world. Blacksmiths became gunsmiths
and tinkers, and wage economies replaced the subsistence agriculture of old.238
However, in the long run, this economic specialisation did little to develop the internal
economy of the African continent. Local economic pressures remained more
important than the affairs of the global economy and Central African peoples only
contact with the wider commercial sphere was as primary producers of the goods
that the Europeans then exported to the markets of the world.239
To conclude, the Arab-Swahili long-distance trade acted as a glass ceiling to the
peoples of East-Central Africa. For the first time they were able to see a commercial
world beyond the confines of their pre-colonial socio-economic networks of
exchange and distribution, and were made to believe that through their interaction
with the Arab-Swahili traders in the African interior they could achieve economic
independence from their traditional overlords. However, when they entered the
sphere of the long-distance trade they found that the lucrative entrepreneurial
middlemen positions had been monopolised firstly by the coastal traders and then by
the European corporations, and all that was left for them was the hauntingly familiar
role of primary producer to a higher controlling power. Arab-Swahili traders
successfully introduced the world economy to East-Central Africa and the people
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who lived there. However, in so doing, they had in fact signed the death warrant for
the traditional networks of exchange that had existed in the interior prior to their
arrival. They left the African people stuck, unable to return to the deceased socio-
economic interactions of old, yet not allowed to properly benefit from the new
commercial world they had had little choice but to enter.
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Map 2 - Map of natural resources in Mweru-Tanganyika. [Roberts, A.D., A History of
the Bemba: Political Growth and change in the north-eastern Zambia before 1900
(Longman, London, 1973), p. 185]
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3. The Last Argument of Kings
240
 Violence in
the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor in the Nineteenth
Century
Violence was a part of daily life for many of the peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor during the nineteenth-century. Warfare and conflict defined much of the
regions history, whether it was internecine cross-border wars between rival villages,
chiefs and clans, or the more organised, professional raiding and hunting of the
Arab-Swahili traders and their ruga-ruga. St John goes so far as to suggest that by
the second half of the nineteenth-century, the true rulers of the Corridor were raiders,
not traders.241 This chapter is devoted to exploring this violence and how the arrival
of coastal traders in Mweru-Tanganyika affected its character.
Firstly, the new military methods and tactics imported into the region by the Arab-
Swahili will be examined, including the employment of ruga-ruga slave-mercenary
soldiers. African responses to their arrival will also be addressed. The importance of
firearms will then be explored, as well as the trade in powder and guns and the
impact these modern weapons had upon the levels of violence in the region. Were
guns the key to the success of the coastal traders in the African interior or has their
role been overemphasised by historians, and other equally important factors, such
as internal African disunity, been marginalised as a result?
Finally, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the ideas put forward by Reid,
who has recently suggested that a military revolution occurred in Central Africa
during the nineteenth-century.242 Much of Reids model focusses upon external
groups, such as the Arab-Swahili, and their role as agents of this military revolution.
Consequently, Mweru-Tanganyika, a region defined by Arab-Swahili violence during
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this period, is the perfect backdrop to determine the accuracy of his ideas. Was there
in fact a military revolution with entirely new motivations driving forward the
violence in the region? Or did the intrusive groups of coastal traders simply
insinuate themselves into societies already fraught with warfare and conflict, turning
pre-existing tensions to their own advantage?
3.1 Ruga-ruga and the African Response to Nineteenth-Century
Violence
One of the most striking features of the coastal traders modus operandi, particularly
in the second half of the nineteenth-century, was their willingness to resort to
extreme levels of violence in order to achieve their exploitative aims. Whilst the
coastal traders themselves must bear responsibility as the instigators of much of the
conflict that engulfed the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor during this period, the true
perpetrators of the day-to-day violence were their heavily-armed followers 
commonly referred to as ruga-ruga.
In the simplest terms, the ruga-ruga were young, professional, slave-mercenaries,
used by the Arab-Swahili traders as a standing military force and paid in ivory, slaves
and other war booty.243 They were the mailed fist of the coastal traders and the
spearhead of their penetration into the African interior.244 Reid describes the ruga-
ruga thus:
(The Arab-Swahili) programmes were carried out by slaves armed with
firearms and a new generation of aggressive and displaced youth, likewise
equipped with muskets and increasingly adept at their use. These were the
professional soldiers known as the ruga-ruga  To some the ruga-ruga were
mere thugs and criminals; it is clear enough, however, that they were part of a
self-perpetuating cycle of socio-political reformation, for military states both
created the upheaval and displacement which made young manpower
available, and then fed off that manpower in pursuit of expanded political
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visions and commercial profit. Ruga-ruga either operated in small,
opportunistic bands, raiding the busy commercial highways, or served as
rootless mercenaries, or committed themselves to the larger state-building
projects proceeding across the region.245
In other words, the ruga-ruga were a product of the violent conditions ushered in by
the Arab-Swahili traders. At the same time, by perpetuating the conflict and warfare
that was endemic in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor they were in fact prolonging
their own existence and encouraging their own use. The more successful their
violent operations, the more ivory and slaves their Arab-Swahili employers would
obtain. The more ivory and slaves they obtained, the more firearms they could buy
with which to arm more ruga-ruga.246 Often, the groups of ruga-ruga numbered in the
thousands and were effectively unstoppable by most of the chiefs in the region,
except the most powerful paramounts and warlords.247
As Reid aptly puts it, the use of professional soldiers by the Arab-Swahili
represented the privatisation of violence in Central Africa.248 By which he infers that
that the Arab-Swahilis use of ruga-ruga represented a distinctive shift away from the
traditional military organisation of the various polities of the Mweru-Tanganyika
region. Prior to the penetration of coastal traders, the ability to raise large, well-
equipped armies was the domain of paramount chiefs and their strongest vassals,
for example the paramount of the Lunda Empire, the Mwata Yamvo, and his
governor of the eastern marches of the empire, the Mwata Kazembe.
These political elites were at the tip of a feudal pyramid of vassals and dependents,
all linked together by networks of distribution and tribute. Paramount chiefs attracted
more people to their polities with the assurance of the protection and organisation
provided by a centralised state and promises of the distribution of imported trade
goods, such as cloth. In exchange, the paramounts dependents would pay him
tribute, either in goods or services. Goods would include items such as ivory and salt
gathered locally by village communities, whereas services ranged from labour on
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public infrastructure works or the gardens and farms of the paramount, to service in
the politys military if required. Therefore, only the most powerful chiefs could gather
significant forces from amongst those obligated to fight for them.
The arrival of the Arab-Swahili and the ruga-ruga changed this. The ruga-ruga fought
for payment and profit rather than out of social obligation and it was possible for
even the lowliest coastal trader to employ a large armed following based upon the
promise of plunder and booty from raids. In addition, the ruga-ruga had no allegiance
to any employer or chief, beyond the one currently paying them, and therefore lesser
headmen and village chiefs were able to organise military forces as never before.
The privatisation of violence saw military strength based upon economic wealth
rather than the control of people and networks of distribution and control, and meant
that even low-level African political elites could expand their own power if they could
afford to pay the ruga-ruga needed to realise their ambitions.
This process was not limited to vassal chiefs and came to influence the military
organisation of many of the regions largest and most powerful polities. Paramount
chiefs began to employ Arab-Swahili traders and their ruga-ruga warriors to gain a
military advantage over their neighbours and rivals, promising them their pick of the
spoils or favourable trading terms. This, combined with the growth in the strength of
vassal-chiefs, saw political violence, at even the highest levels, reliant upon external
allied and mercenary forces rather than the traditional feudalistic system of military
service by sub-chiefs and their men who were required to fight for their paramount
chief.
As with their Arab-Swahili employers, the ruga-ruga were a very heterogeneous
group. They belonged to many of the peoples of the Central African interior. Many of
them were individuals who had entered the Arab-Swahili world as slaves and
porters. While some ruga-ruga hailed from the Swahili coast itself, others as Moloney
reported, did not even speak Swahili.249 The Nyamwezi were particularly prominent
within the ruga-ruga ranks.250 They operated in such numbers and with such
strength that some of them were even able to set up their own independent polities 
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Garenganze, the conquest state of Msiris Yeke in southern Katanga, being a
notable example. A handful of professional soldiers in the employment of the Arab-
Swahili were not even Africans. Burton mentioned hiring eight ex-ruga-ruga Baloch
mercenaries for his journey across Africa when he arrived at Zanzibar in 1856.251
Baluchis originated from the coastal regions of modern-day Iran and Pakistan, and
found their way into East-Central Africa by way of the Omani Sultanate and
Zanzibar. Unlike many of the Arab-Swahili, the Baluchi were known for their
discipline, professionalism and lack of attachment to the Swahili coast, which made
them perfect for military use in the interior.252
The ruga-rugas ethnic heterogeneity was but one facet of their complex history.
Although ostensibly trained as soldiers, the ruga-ruga were employed in a variety of
roles by their Arab-Swahili paymasters.253 Besides taking part in direct military
operations and slave raids, they also guarded caravans, hunted for food and ivory,
collected tribute from their masters vassals, and patrolled the borders of Arab-
Swahili-controlled lands in the interior, sometimes acting as a form of military police
and even as symbolic deterrents for any opposition to coastal dominance in the
Mweru-Tanganyika region.254 Writing from just north-west of Lake Mweru in January
1887, Hermann von Wissmann was particularly contemptuous about their role in the
collecting of tribute on behalf of their coastal trader employers. The German explorer
called it an arbitrary system of pillaging and a reckless system of extortion.255
An important task sometimes assigned to prominent and loyal ruga-ruga was to lead
caravans into the African interior in the absence of their Arab-Swahili employers.256
These exceptionally well-trusted individuals were the most loyal and capable of the
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Arab-Swahilis armed followers, and therefore entrusted with the success of entire
caravans. Many of the most famous traders in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor
during the second half of the nineteenth-century started their careers as ruga-ruga
mercenaries. Abdullah ibn Suliman and his lieutenant, Nsemiwe, were both prime
examples of this trend, becoming two of the most feared traders in Mweru-
Tanganyika by the time of the establishment of British colonial rule in Central Africa.
Abdullah ibn Suliman was an Arab-Swahili from the island of Pemba who first arrived
in Mweru-Tanganyika in 1867 with Tippu Tips second expedition into the African
interior as one of thirty young men who formed the core of the caravan.257 After
Tippu Tip moved on into the Congo, Abdullah stayed in Itabwa in support of Kumba
Kumba, until the latters eventual exit from the region in 1876.258 This effectively left
Abdullah as Tippu Tips representative in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor for the rest
of the nineteenth-century, although he acted largely independently of the trader.
Andrew Roberts describes a situation of developing dominance by Abdullah,
reducing local African chiefs, such as Nsama of the Tabwa, to positions of virtual
clientage throughout the period.259
Nsemiwe Kalangula was Abdullahs second-in-command and was a Nyamwezi chief
from Unyanyembe who led some 700 Nyamwezi in the service of the Arab-
Swahili.260 He was well-known for his independence and opposition to any outside
influence on the region under Arab-Swahili control in Mweru Tanganyika and even
took over Abdullahs village upon the Arab-Swahilis death in 1916.261 He famously
destroyed the British flag given to the Tabwa Chief, Mukula, by Alfred Sharpe and
was then besieged by C.F.S. forces along with his trading partner, Masala, in August
1894, an action that led to Masalas death.262
These two figures will be discussed further in Chapter 4, but from these brief
biographies it is clear to see the career paths taken by many prominent traders in the
later decades of the nineteenth-century in Mweru-Tanganyika. They emerged from
257













relative obscurity amongst the ranks of the ruga-ruga and other military followers of
leading traders, such as Tippu Tip and Kumba Kumba, to become merchants in their
own right and dominate regions of the African interior and the peoples who lived
therein.
The effects of the ruga-rugas actions were generally pernicious for African societies
in the Mweru-Tanganyika region during this period.263 Whilst they operated in a very
similar way to the Arab-Swahili themselves, the ruga-ruga were seen to be more
brutal in their methods and they often exceeded the levels of violence usually
employed by the coastal traders.264 For example, to the north of Lake Mweru,
unrestrained ruga-ruga deployed as sharpshooters in the long grass, fired at local
peoples at will, purposefully stopping the free movement of people so they could
continue their violent depopulation and exploitation of the region.265
Even von Wissmann, renowned as he was in Central Africa for his confrontational
nature and often violent exchanges with the Bemba and Arab-Swahili traders and
their ruga-ruga, commented upon the ferocity of the ruga-ruga, describing them as
far more vicious and merciless than the Arab-Swahili traders they served. He wrote:
he (the Arab-Swahili trader) is not capable of such designing wickedness as
those slaves of his, the half-blood brutes from the coast, who, besides the
tribute which they have to pay to their master, provide for themselves by
stealing slave wherever they can  (the Arab-Swahili) little cares how his
people look after themselves.266
Von Wissmann continued by suggesting that only the direct presence of senior
coastal traders, such as Tippu Tip or Rumaliza, curtailed the violent excesses often
wrought by the ruga-ruga on the peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor.267
Crawford was equally scathing of ruga-ruga activities in the region. He met a group
of them led by Senami, a Nyamwezi lieutenant of the coastal trader Nshimba, to the
west of Lake Mweru in December 1895. He wrote that their (the ruga-ruga) name
became ultimately the verb to murder and loot and was disgusted by the necklaces
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of human teeth that they wore and how they had little ear for the gospel.268
However, he does continue by saying that they listened to his preaching and
responded positively, promising to reform their murderous ways. It is debateable
whether this was a true conversion of Senami and his ruga-ruga to Christian ideals
or whether the Nyamwezi leader was simply shrewd enough to see the direction in
which the wind was blowing, with the C.F.S. swiftly encroaching upon Lake Mwerus
western shore, and hoped that favourable relations with the missionary would help
him in the long run.269
In addition, some of these ruga-ruga caravan leaders split off from their employers
and set themselves up as traders in their own right. These unaffiliated mercenaries-
turned-traders often came into conflict with the larger Arab-Swahili trading alliances,
such as Tippu Tips el-Murjebi clique. On occasion, war even broke out between the
different coastal interests. For example, Sharpe noted that Kabunda, the Baluchi
trader at the southern tip of Lake Tanganyika, had consistently bad relations with
Tippu Tips el-Murjebi traders as he was not from the Swahili coast as they were.
Also, by the time of Sharpes visit to Kabunda, the Baluchi was elderly and reliant
upon good relations with and support from the British for his continued rule in the
area.270 Therefore, it was a considerable risk for a coastal trader to entrust his
caravan to a slave-mercenary henchman without his personal oversight.
Despite their extreme actions against the peoples of the region and potential for
betraying their employers, what the ruga-ruga offered to the Arab-Swahili traders
was the ability to gather large numbers of heavily-armed soldiers at short notice to
carry out any tasks that were required of them.271 They gave the coastal traders an
effective method of fluid and flexible control over the peoples and resources of the
Mweru-Tanganyika region.272
In response to the use of the ruga-ruga and violent marauding tactics by the Arab-
Swahili, the various inhabitants of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor throughout the
nineteenth-century developed their own counter-measures. The most important and
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widely reported of these was the investment of time and energy in fortifying villages,
camps and stations by their residents. Fortifications were developed by everyone,
from local African peoples to European administrators and missionaries, and even by
the Arab-Swahili traders themselves.273 The concentration of previously scattered
peoples and the defensive fortification of settlements for the first time during the
early nineteenth-century was the way in which peoples such as the Nyamwezi and
Eastern Lunda of Kazembe reacted to the increasing violence in East-Central
Africa.274
In addition, there was an obvious shift in military tactics in the region during the
nineteenth-century, with a move away from the sustained assaults and frontal
charges of old, to more measured, less intensive warfare, such as sieges. For
example, Alfred Sharpe reported that the Bemba and Arab-Swahili laid siege to the
capital of Nsama VI Chimutwe in 1891 for over 3 months before finally defeating the
Tabwa paramount.275
One of the most prominent examples of a siege on a fortified settlement in Mweru-
Tanganyika during the nineteenth-century involved a contemporary European
observer. The aforementioned German explorer, von Wissmann was never one to
avoid conflict, and throughout the 1890s his often over-zealous opposition to the
slaving of the Arab-Swahili and raiding activities of the regions more militaristic
peoples had the British commissioner, Johnston, frustrated to say the least. To the
British it seemed that Von Wissmann was intent on fighting every group of slavers or
raiders he came across, despite being within the British sphere and engaging
peoples often considered peaceable by the British administration. 276
In 1893, the correspondences of the officials of the B.C.A.P. contained many
accounts of von Wissmanns engagements with the Bemba.277 The German was
reported to have been both besieged and besieger in a short period during early
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July, firstly being besieged by a Bemba raiding party some 5000 strong in the village
of the Lungu chief, Nondo/Nando, not far from Fife station. When the Europeans
refused to leave the village to its fate at the hands of the Bemba and negotiations
broke down, the German forces opened fire on the besieging Bemba with grenades,
rifles, cannon-fire and a Maxim machine gun leaving many Bemba dead and swiftly
ending the siege.278
Shortly afterwards, von Wissmann found himself on the other side of the stockade
after he was fired upon by Meso and his men, dependents of Abdullah ibn Suliman.
The Europeans once again prevailed, breaching the stockade and sacking Mesos
fortified village.279 The events of July 1893 in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor
encapsulate the shift away from the traditional fluid, marauding military tactics of
Central Africa and the widespread adoption of measured siege engagements and
larger pitched battles by all the various groups in the region. The driving factor
behind this change was the developing idea of fortification of villages and
settlements.
The African peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor fortified extensively in the
face of raids from the Bemba and Arab-Swahili traders ruga-ruga. Historically, the
people who dwelled near the shores of Lake Mweru and Tanganyika had open
settlements, whereas those who lived in the highland plateaus had already begun to
stockade their villages against Bemba raids.280 Willis, Sharpe, E.J. Glave, Andrew
Roberts and the missionaries of the Plymouth Brethren all wrote about the
development of defensive fortifications by the African peoples of the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor.
Willis reported that the Mambwe and Lungu surrounded their villages with stockades
and ditches to combat Bemba raids in the mid-1880s.281 These fortress-villages
had walls, gates and even arrow slits and escape routes built in.282 According to
Sharpe, these methods were being copied by Chief Mukula of the Tabwa near
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Sumbu, to deter ruga-ruga raids, at the time of his visit in the early 1890s. He wrote
that Mukulas village was a large one  surrounded by a double mud wall,
loopholed for muskets, and a deep ditch.283 This trend amongst the Tabwa was also
confirmed by the American journalist Glave near to the British Kalungwishi station in
August 1894. He wrote that the Tabwa of the Corridor were building substantial
villages to deter the ruga-ruga of Abdullah ibn Suliman.284 The missionaries of the
Plymouth Brethren also witnessed the fortification of villages across the region
against ruga-ruga raids and the building of stockades in Katanga to combat Yeke
incursions.285
Europeans also recognised the value of fortifying their stations and posts in Mweru-
Tanganyika during this era, and used the tactic extensively to protect their interests.
The L.M.S. notably fortified and militarised their stations near Lake Tanganyika to
deter Bemba and Arab-Swahili raids in the late 1880s,286 and the British colonial
administration turned their stations at Abercorn and Fife into what effectively
amounted to fortresses.287 Fife was reportedly impregnable to all the peoples of the
region, both African and Arab-Swahili.288
European rule did have the effect of stabilising the region to a certain extent, and
many of the local African peoples saw the removal of Arab-Swahili traders from the
region as a chance to start refocussing their efforts away from the defence and
fortification of their settlements.289 Willis wrote of the break-up of many of the larger
fortified villages in Mweru-Tanganyika and claimed that by the twentieth-century
villages of over 100 people were rare, with even the biggest settlements barely
reaching 200 residents.290
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The Arab-Swahili were also not blind to the advantages of fortifications in this era
and built stockades in most of their camps and villages.291 Andrew Roberts describes
how both Tippu Tip and Abdullah built sturdy, well-sited and fortified villages as
bases during their time spent in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor.292
Aside from fortification, many of the peoples directly affected by the violence in the
region during the nineteenth-century took the simple evasive step of relocating to
safer areas, either protected by more powerful leaders or just away from the
immediate conflict. For example, Reid mentions many Nyamwezi abandoning conflict
areas in their homeland, rather than stay to fight the intruders or fortify their
settlements.293 In addition, the Echoes of Service repeatedly mentions the
resettlement of displaced African peoples around the Plymouth Brethren
missionaries at their stations across the region. Crawford was particularly well known
for gathering refugees of the violence in Mweru-Tanganyika, to the extent that he
became known by the honorific epithet Konga Bantu or Gatherer of People by the
1890s.294
Many refugees gathered around the European stations in the region to benefit from
the security they provided against the Arab-Swahili and militaristic African peoples
bent upon raiding their homelands. This can be seen in the report by Glave,
mentioned above, of Tabwa people resettling close to the British administrations
station on the Kalungwishi River. The relocation of local peoples to areas around
European settlements, during this period, was an alternative strategy employed by
the Africans in reaction to the arrival of the Arab-Swahili and the violence they
brought with them. This interaction between the newly-arrived European colonialists,
the local peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and the Arab-Swahili traders will
be covered in greater depth in Chapter 4.
3.2 Firearms in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor
Firearms played a pivotal role in the Arab-Swahili penetration of the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor. Not only were the coastal traders and their dependents
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equipped with guns, but they also traded them to many of the peoples of the African
interior, making them an important medium of exchange in the region. Reid claims
that over the course of the nineteenth-century, some 16 million firearms entered the
African continent as a whole. No doubt these were of variable quality and impact, but
some at least were used effectively.295 According to Low Monteith Fotheringham, the
A.L.C. agent at the northern end of Lake Malawi in September 1893, Central Africa
was at the time flooded with Arab-Swahili-imported guns and powder.296
This section of the chapter will explore both the role of firearms in the violence
across Mweru-Tanganyika during this period and also the geographical spread of
firearms from the coastal traders to the local peoples. It will then conclude with an
assessment of the importance of guns in the Arab-Swahili domination of the region.
Unsurprisingly, guns were central to Mweru-Tanganyikan violence. Almost all of the
coastal traders and their ruga-ruga cohorts were armed in some way and a great
many with firearms. Swann described this amongst Tippu Tips forces when he wrote
that thousands of men and guns were at that moment at his command.297 The
penetration of coastal traders into Mweru-Tanganyika also brought guns to the
region in large numbers and they swiftly began to make their presence felt. Guns
were vital to Arab-Swahili activities, whether it was the carrying out of military
operations against peoples of the Corridor or simply the hunting of animals in the
region.298 The power of guns in war is well known to people of the twenty-first
century, but to the nineteenth century inhabitants of Central Africa they represented
a massive departure from their traditional armament of spears, swords and bows and
arrows. With guns, a simple squeeze of the trigger could end the reign of a fearsome
African warlord or bring down a towering bull elephant and this potential for murder
was certainly exploited to its maximum extent. Guns, in this sense, were something
of leveller in Central African society and undoubtedly provided the Arab-Swahili with
an advantage over their opponents.
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For the peoples living in Katanga, the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and the Luapula
Valley, guns were a symbol as much as they were a weapon. For the Tabwa people,
guns represented the momentous changes that occurred in their society during this
era, something perfectly exemplified in the development of their language. The word
for pistol in KiTabwa was the same as the word for comet, both of which were
seen as symbols preceding times of great upheaval and change. Livingstone
reported that Nsama III Chipili Chipioka was openly scared of firearms when the
explorer visited him, having only recently been forced out of his own capital by Tippu
Tips gun-armed men. 299 Therefore, guns, and the idea of their power, had a major
effect upon the psyche of the African peoples of the region.
Some of the first non-Arab-Swahili to obtain firearms were the African peoples who
operated as commercial intermediaries between the traders and peoples of the
interior, for example the Nyamwezi and the Sumbwa/Yeke. These African
intermediaries were given guns by the Arab-Swahili if they served in their trading
caravans, or would independently trade commodities with the coastal merchants in
exchange for guns and powder.300 The Yeke of Katanga relied particularly upon their
firearms to establish and maintain their dominance, importing vast amounts of
powder into the region. Shortages of powder were all that seemed to hold back
Msiris ambitions during the middle decades of the nineteenth-century.301
However, the main Arab-Swahili trade in firearms and powder was to the chiefs and
peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika themselves.302 They traded the firearms they brought
from the coast for the slaves gathered in raids by the various peoples of the interior.
This in many ways perpetuated the trade by providing the means by which the
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slavers carried out their harrowing trade.303 Moloney, of Captain William Stairs
C.F.S. expedition, had the following to say about the sale of firearms in the region in
1890: the Arabs rule the roost, and smuggle guns and ammunition galore, without
any interference. He also reported that this class of merchandise (guns and
powder) commands a ready market.304 Clearly, the Arab-Swahili trade in arms was
extensive throughout this region of Central Africa and chiefs and paramounts who
ruled there presented a ready market with plenty of commodities to exchange with
the coastal merchants.
Large African polities, such as the Eastern Lunda of Kazembe and Bemba, were
some of the most enthusiastic participants in the trade in firearms. For example, the
Lunda of Kazembe possessed firearms as early as the first half of the nineteenth-
century, according Said bin Habib, and Macola suggests that by 1890 they had a
vast arsenal of guns in their possession.305
The Bemba present a more interesting case of an African peoples relationship with
Arab-Swahili imported firearms. The Bemba were known as one of the most
militaristic peoples of the region and prolific raiders of their neighbours. It was quickly
discovered by both the Bemba and Arab-Swahili traders that economic cooperation,
as opposed to conflict, was preferable to both sides and a trade in coastal guns for
slaves obtained by the Bemba quickly developed.306 Broadly speaking, the Bembas
access to firearms coincided with a flourishing of their polity. However, the direct role
of guns in this success is questionable.307 The Bemba possessed guns from around
1868, according to Andrew Roberts, and were assisted in 1870 by Arab-Swahili
gunmen in defeating an Ngoni raid on their land.308 Arguably, it was Tippu Tips
defeat of Nsama III and his Tabwa in 1867, not far from the Bembas northern
border, that showed the potential of firearms for the first time and encouraged their
trade. Incidentally, this coincided with a large supply of muzzle-loading guns
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reaching the world market, as European powers replaced them in their arsenals with
breech-loading rifles.309
Roberts contends that in 1883 firearms were still not particularly widespread
amongst the Bemba. A royal monopoly may have even existed on their use during
this period, but this was soon to change.310 In 1884, the Bemba and Arab-Swahili
met in battle for the one and only time during this period.311 The defeat handed down
to the Africans by the coastal traders and their firearms appeared to change attitudes
towards guns in Ubemba, and, by the 1890s, Roberts claims that guns amongst the
Bemba had risen in importance, increasing greatly in number, and that powder had
become the highly valued item it was elsewhere in the region.312 However, Sharpe
witnessed Bemba raids in the early 1890s and claimed that they (the Bemba) fight
with spears and have few guns.313 This would suggest that, whilst guns were
certainly growing in importance in Bemba society during the 1890s, they had yet to
reach everyday use in the raids carried out by Bemba war bands.
It is clear from these examples that the arming of African peoples by the Arab-
Swahili allowed militaristically-minded chiefs to expand both economically and
territorially at the cost of their weaker neighbours.314 However, in the long run this
reliance by African elites on outsiders was unsustainable as a model of rule, as can
be seen with the violent and despotic rule of Msiri in Katanga.315
Finally, the importance of firearms in the Arab-Swahili dominance of Mweru-
Tanganyika during the nineteenth-century will be considered. It has been widely
assumed that the coastal traders access to guns was the fundamental reason for
their military and economic success in the African interior. However, questions have
since been raised as to whether firearms were as effective in this process as initially
assumed.
In December 1888, the Echoes of Service published a damning indictment of the
gun-toting Arab-Swahili traders activities.
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From the east the Arabs carry war and destruction inwards, and having the
advantage of firearms do not hesitate to depopulate large portions of the
country in order to obtain a few hundred slaves.316
Livingstone himself suggested that the power of the Arab-Swahili derived from their
ownership of firearms. Writing from near Nsama IIIs capital in central Itabwa in
August 1867, he argued that They (the Arab-Swahili) bully as much as they please
by their firearms and later, in southern Manyema in November 1870, reported that
African residents of the region said If we encourage the Arabs to trade, they come
and kill us with their guns.317 Therefore, it is clear that firearms were considered
particularly important for the continuing dominance of the region by contemporary
European observers.
However, Livingstone did also state that the power of firearms for the Arab-Swahili
lay in the fear and the noise they produced.318 Lary and Wright have since agreed
with this assessment, suggesting that rather than relying upon the actual destructive
power of guns, the coastal traders instead used them in displays of military strength
and intimidation, rather than direct action.319 Livingstone continued by claiming that,
once the lack of potency of the Arab-Swahili firearms was realised by the African
peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika, much of their mystique and power was actually
lost.320
In A History of the Bemba, Andrew Roberts qualified his earlier statements, by
agreeing with Lary and Wright. He suggests that their actual military significance was
minimal and physical usage relatively rare in comparison to what was initially
assumed.321 Lary and Wright suggest that guns provided a minor advantage to
traders and nothing more, which realistically was more accurate than assuming guns
alone allowed the Arab-Swahili to effectively penetrate and then dominate the
Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and its resident peoples.322
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In his introduction to his edition of the colonially-recorded History of Abdullah ibn
Suliman, Roberts elaborated on the same idea:
In such processes of infiltration, the possession of guns was not necessarily a
more important factor than disputes within chiefly families and the ability of
either party to call on reinforcements through a far-flung network of
associates.323
Therefore, rather than insisting that firearms alone let the coastal traders dominate
the region, it is suggested that internal divisions between various African peoples
and chiefs allowed the Arab-Swahili to effectively infiltrate Mweru-Tanganyika.
Coastal traders took advantage of inter-African tensions and were able to set
opposing African royal pretenders against one other, supporting the one who was
most likely to provide them with the most advantageous possible trading terms.
Thus, with both sides weakened by the ensuing civil war, the Arab-Swahili were able
to marginalise the puppet ruler whom they had brought to the throne, to the point
where the country was effectively under their control.324 This introduced a new
pattern of political behaviour whereby African royal pretenders began to rely upon
outside assistance to force their way onto the throne.325
This process can be observed in the nineteenth-century political history of the
Eastern Lunda polity of Kazembe, with the Arab-Swahili being the first external group
to enter the kingdom with any political efficacy. Lunda nobles began to rely on
political alliances with Arab-Swahili traders to gain access to the throne, as Cunnison
explained, Without a willing external force, like that of the Arabs, no Lunda prince
gained kingship by rebellion.326 Lary and Wright rather accurately sum up the entire
situation when they suggest that guns won battles for the Arab-Swahili, but it was
skilled internal politicking that won the wars.327
Firearms did undoubtedly play a role in the Arab-Swahili penetration and takeover of
the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor. They were used extensively by both the Arab-
Swahili themselves and the various African peoples they traded with. Firearms
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certainly helped extend the lifespan of the slave trade in East-Central Africa and
allowed militaristically-minded chiefs and paramounts to expand their own
powerbases at the expense of their neighbours. Some Central African polities, such
as the Bembas, benefited greatly from their military and economic interaction with
the coastal traders and found a ready outlet for the slaves and other resources that
they gathered in their raids on the surrounding countries.
However, guns cannot be viewed as solely responsible for the success of the Arab-
Swahili in Mweru-Tanganyika during the nineteenth-century. Internal divisions
between the various peoples and chiefs infiltrated by the coastal traders proved to be
just as important in their occupation of the region as the use of firearms. Therefore,
the reasons behind the dominance of the region by coastal traders can be seen as
multifaceted, with the effect of the combined factors far more important than the
effect of any single aspect.
3.3 Conflict in Mweru-Tanganyika  A Military Revolution?
The final section of this chapter will discuss Reids assertion that Central Africa, with
the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor as a perfect microcosm, experienced a military
revolution during the nineteenth-century. War and conflict were endemic to Mweru-
Tanganyika and it is largely agreed by contemporary observers and modern
historians that violence held back the development of the region as much as, if not
more than, the slave trade. Alfred Sharpe described the effects of the violence thus:
Hitherto war, the African bugbear, has prevented any development in these
regions.328
Reid defines his term military revolution as the deployment of organised violence
and coercion for economic and political means and seems to present intrusive
groups, such as the Arab-Swahili, as the main agents of this revolution.329 He sees
war and conflict during this era as driven by the dual aims of controlling resources
and labour and maximising production, and argues that this struggle was one of the
greatest causes of conflict in Africa.330
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This military revolution was driven by demographic and environmental shifts, but
more importantly, by the advance of the global commercial frontier in the form of the
long-distance trade.331 In other words, Reids revolution was caused by the
incorporation of East-Central Africa into the world economy and the fact that, in order
to meet the demands of global markets, intrusive groups of coastal traders began to
use violence to control the commercial resources of the region, beginning with slaves
and ivory. By controlling these resources and the regions people and maximising
their productive capacity, the Arab-Swahili were able to profit as the middlemen in a
trade that stretched from the elephant marshes of Lake Mweru to the drawing
rooms of the British gentry.
However, in order to economically benefit as they did, the Arab-Swahili were forced
to introduce new patterns of organised violence and coercion to Mweru-Tanganyika
which definitively changed ideas of military organisation amongst the peoples of
Central Africa, often to their detriment. The military revolution was grounded firmly
in the lake regions of East-Central Africa and the peoples that dwelled there, but it
was entirely dependent upon external factors from the global economy. The Arab-
Swahili were simply the agents of this revolution, linking worldwide commercial
demands to the resource-rich lands of Central Africa, employing coercive violence in
the latter to satisfy the former.
As Reid writes:
(The military revolution) was the outcome of the new era of economic
relations with the West  (whereby) the so-called illegal slave trade
perpetuated and intensified earlier patterns of organised violence  leading
to new military and political forms.332
In light of the above, Reids theory of a military revolution in Central Africa in the
nineteenth-century seems to perfectly encapsulate and describe Arab-Swahili
activities in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor at this time. In response to the
developing demands of the global economy, the traders used violence and the threat
of it to control the peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika and maximise the production of
331




slaves, ivory, salt and other commodities that they then exported out of the African
continent.
Based as it was on exploitation, the entire system was unsustainable and the
violence used against the peoples of the region did indeed hinder Arab-Swahili trade
as much as it created and maintained it.333 By the time of the European colonisation
of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor in the 1880s and 1890s, commodities were
becoming scarce, the population had evolved to fight the violence that struck at them
daily, and the traders themselves commanded loyalty only out of fear or through
ample financial rewards for their supporters. Indeed, many African chiefs who had
prospered under the Arab-Swahili began to switch their allegiance to the European
colonialists who provided them with both greater economic benefits and protection
from vengeful coastal traders.
African agency is an important factor in Reids theory, providing the link between the
Arab-Swahili and peoples of East-Central Africa that allowed the military revolution
to occur. If the coastal traders had not been able to insinuate themselves into
regional patterns of commercial exchange, pioneered by groups such as the
Nyamwezi, it is doubtful whether the revolution would have ever taken place.
With the arrival of the long-distance trade, traditional political elites found their power
increasingly diminished as the coastal traders began to monopolise networks of
commercial exchange previously controlled by paramount chiefs. Once ensconced in
the region, the Arab-Swahili were able to use their heavily-armed ruga-ruga
dependents to maintain their new gained mercantile supremacy and enter the
political sphere, aiming to take control of the production of the commodities they
were exporting from the interior. This was Reids military revolution in action. The
coastal traders penetrated Mweru-Tanganyika along established regional trade
networks with the assistance of African mercantile peoples, only to move from simple
trade to the establishment of political control through the use of violence, in order to
achieve economic and political domination.
Reids theory, whilst acknowledging earlier patterns of violence in the region, does
cast sufficient light on the socio-political situation that the coastal traders
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encountered in the interior in general, and Mweru-Tanganyika in particular, in the
nineteenth-century. This situation was characterised by deep divisions and vicious
rivalries. Andrew Roberts says as much in his History of the Bemba, arguing that the
traders exploited pre-existing divisions amongst the Tabwa, for example, whilst
allying themselves with strong local leaders, such as the Chitimukulu of the Bemba,
a description echoed by Lary and Wright.334
While these considerations do not invalidate Reids theory of military revolution, it is
important to remember that the Arab-Swahili were not just intrusive traders willing to
use violence and coercion to further their own economic gains; they were also
kindling to the already blazing flames of internal conflict in the region, as described in
the Echoes of Service in August 1894.335 A military revolution did indeed occur in
Central Africa during this period, and the Arab-Swahili and mercantile African
peoples were certainly the agents of this transformation. However, the internal
discord between many of the peoples and chiefs of Mweru-Tanganyika prevented
them from being able to withstand the intrusion of the traders and combat their
forcible entrance into Central African politics.
The civil wars and internecine rivalries of Mweru-Tanganyika were certainly a major
factor in the Arab-Swahili domination of the region. The coastal traders were able to
penetrate the region, presenting themselves as powerful potential allies to the chiefs
of Mweru-Tanganyika against their rivals, which only encouraged further conflict. In
turn, this conflict stimulated further interaction between the African elites and coastal
traders, as the chiefs sought to maintain their advantage over their neighbours by
employing the Arab-Swahili as mercenaries or trading with them for firearms. Both of
these eventualities economically benefited the traders whilst simultaneously
weakening the political elites of the region
With regards to the early years of the Arab-Swahili entrance into the region, Lary and
Wrights analogy of the coastal traders as land-based examples of the British gun-
boat diplomacy is not far from the truth.336 The Arab-Swahili were well-armed,
politically savvy traders, directing the peoples of Mweru-Tanganyika in routes
favourable to themselves, only interfering when absolutely necessary to maintain
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their dominance. Even Tippu Tip, who pioneered Arab-Swahili interventionist tactics,
would not randomly engage in conflict with African chiefs and headmen without a
specific reason to do so. He attacked Nsama III to end the chiefs opposition to
coastal trading activities in the region, proving that internal division certainly had a
part to play in the military revolution theorised by Reid.
In conclusion, Reids theory of a military revolution in Central Africa during this
period can be viewed directly in the actions of the Arab-Swahili traders in the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor. In Mweru-Tanganyika, the Arab-Swahili certainly used coercion
and violence to further their own political and economic ends. However, it is clear
that the discord-riven lands of the Corridor were a perfect place for intrusive groups
to penetrate and slowly dominate over time. The Arab-Swahili may have had a far
more difficult route to domination than they did, if the people of the region had been
unified behind strong leadership rather than scattered and quarrelsome. Crawford
summed up the situation amongst the African peoples of the region upon the arrival
of the Arab-Swahili most accurately with his description of who the true enemies of
the Africans were.
As everywhere so here, the greatest enemies of the black men are internal 
first the enemy of his own heart, then the enemy of his own household, and
anon the enemy of the next hut. And so African tribes are consumed one of
another.337
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4. Civilisation is killing out the old  ways of the
land
338
- The Arab-Swahili and European Colonial
Administrations, 1880s  c. 1900
This final chapter will discuss the last two decades of the nineteenth-century in the
Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and the relationships between the newly-arrived
European colonial representatives and the entrenched Arab-Swahili traders in the
region. Prior to the 1880s, Europeans had not been absent from the interior of
Central Africa, as proved by the diaries and travelogues of early Portuguese
explorers and British travellers and missionaries such as Livingstone and Burton. In
truth, though, these early visitors had been little more than observers of the activities
of the Arab-Swahili and their influence upon the peoples of the region had been, at
most, transitory.339
However, the final twenty years of the 1800s saw Europeans enter Mweru-
Tanganyika and its surrounding districts, with the idea of colonisation for the first
time. This naturally brought them into conflict with the Arab-Swahili of the Corridor,
who had arguably already colonised this region of East-Central Africa. The British,
Germans and the C.F.S. all encroached on Mweru-Tanganyika during this period,
ostensibly with the goal of ending the slave trade prevalent in the region.340
However, more realistically, the Europeans were also drawn by the potential of great
commercial wealth.
Conflict was inevitable and the ruga-ruga, as the main instruments of Arab-Swahili
will, caused great problems for the Europeans. The arrival of European colonial
representatives in the region swiftly diminished Arab-Swahili power and control, and
the ruga-ruga were used to fight officials of the British, Belgian and German
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administrations in an attempt to reinforce the dissolving coastal dominance in
Mweru-Tanganyika. Despite their ruthlessness, arsenals of firearms, skill at arms
and military organisation, the ruga-ruga could not stand up to the trained and
disciplined opposition provided by the colonial forces employed by European
officials.341 Whilst they initially represented a potential threat to colonial
administrators, the ruga-ruga as an effective, organised military force ceased to exist
with the end of Arab-Swahili dominance of the region.342 The Germans even resorted
to actively hunting down the roving bands of ruga-ruga as part of their operations to
expel the coastal traders from East-Central Africa.343
With their previous mercenary role at an end, the ruga-ruga began to resort to petty
banditry or drifted into the employ of the various European colonial entities as porters
or mercenaries, in much the same way as they had entered the service of coastal
traders.344 According to the British South Africa Companys collector in Mweru-
Tanganyika, Dr A. Blair Watson stationed at Kalungwishi on the eastern shore of
Lake Mweru since 1893, the ruga-ruga remained very well-armed despite their fall
from grace, but promised British officials that their days of lawlessness were behind
them.345 However, as Allen Roberts notes, they were entirely mercenary and
effectively uncontrollable by European administrations.346 The only way that they had
previously been kept in line by the Arab-Swahili was through a system of Koranic
discipline which was merciless to disobedience and disloyalty. The ruga-ruga
famously only obeyed those that they respected and feared and, therefore, generally
ignored the orders and dictates of minor colonial officials, particularly if they were
inexperienced or had little reputation in the region.347 It is for this reason that traders
such as Nshimba of Kilwa Island developed such fearsome reputations, as they had
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to appear even more daunting to their own minions than to the peoples they were
preying upon.
This conflict came to dominate the new European colonies in and around Mweru-
Tanganyika, and much of what will be examined below is the tit-for-tat process of
small skirmishes between ruga-ruga and colonial police forces, with the traders
attempting to hold on to their lands in the region and the Europeans lacking the
strength to completely remove the Arab-Swahili from East-Central Africa once and
for all.
In exploring the relationship between the Arab-Swahili and the European colonial
powers, two main case studies will be examined. The first example will be the more
peaceful and economically-centred interaction between the B.C.A.P. of Johnston and
Sharpe and the traders of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor, consisting of men of the
el-Murjebi clique under Abdullah ibn Suliman and several independent traders such
as Kabunda. The second example will be the violent anti-slavery and occupation
campaigns of the C.F.S. in Katanga and also against Nshimba on Lake Mweru,
under officers such as Captain Clément Brasseur, Captain William Stairs, Lieutenant
Legat, Captain Descamps and Lieutenant Duvivier,
The most important sources for this period are the records of both the Plymouth
Brethren missionary society, as published in their in-house journal, The Echoes of
Service, and the B.C.A.P., specifically its correspondence with the central
government and Foreign Office in London.
4.1 The Arab-Swahili and the British Central African Administration
The British had long been among the most enthusiastic visitors to and explorers of
East-Central Africa during the nineteenth-century. Even today, names such as
Livingstone, Burton, Thomson and Crawford have come to define Central Africa in
the minds of many British people. However, it is important to remember that most of
these early travellers and missionaries reached Central Africa before any direct
British political involvement in the region. Thus, they were little more than observers
of events over which they had no influence.
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The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 set out the broad spheres of influence of the
European powers in Central Africa. The British sphere extended from the south, in
present-day Zimbabwe and southern Zambia, into a salient caught between the
Portuguese across Lake Nyasa in Mozambique in the east, the Germans in present-
day Tanzania to the north and the C.F.S. in Manyema to the north of Lake Mweru
and Katanga to the west of the Luapula River.
The businessman Cecil Rhodes obtained a Charter to found the B.S.A.C. in 1889
and was soon convinced to fund an operation in Nyasaland to combat the Arab-
Swahili slave trade.348 He swiftly employed the consul Johnston as the first High
Commissioner of the protectorate itself, and the administration was created over two
years until its eventual ratification in 1891.349 As Johnston was both an employee of
the British Foreign Office and an agent of Rhodes B.S.A.C., the B.C.A.P. was
legitimised by the British government but in reality funded by the B.S.A.C.350 This
territory north of the Zambesi River was then divided in two, the first half, roughly
corresponding to present-day Malawi, being administered by the Government
without B.S.A.C. intervention, whilst the second half to the west of the protectorate
would be developed and exploited by the Company, with Johnston as a supervisor
over proceedings.351 In addition, Johnston had command of the Companys armed
forces north of the Zambesi, being able to use them as he pleased. These men
formed the basis of the colonial police forces that will be referred to below.352
Mweru-Tanganyika lay in this second area of land and therefore came under the
purview of the B.S.A.C., whilst still being effectively headed by Johnston and his
assistants. Johnston spent much of the 1890s consolidating both the governments
and Companys position in the region which meant dealing with the long-established
dominance of the Arab-Swahili in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and their violent
slave trading activities.
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This territorial administrative division lasted until 1895, when spiralling costs and a
lack of direct control over Johnstons actions and spending saw Rhodes and the
B.S.A.C split from Nyasaland, removing company involvement in the protectorate
completely. They sought to focus their resources upon the region that they had
always held sway over which, by this point, was well on the way towards becoming
Northern Rhodesia.353
As can be seen from the creation of the B.C.A.P., British policy in the colonisation of
the region differed greatly from that of neighbouring colonial powers. The relative
administrative independence of the B.C.A.P. from the central government in London
meant that Johnston, whilst holding a government post, acted largely as agent of the
B.S.A.C., with the government in London only intervening if the colony became
hugely profitable, taxes were not being paid or it no longer swore fealty to the British
crown. Elise Trivier greatly admired the British method for relying upon the Company
to fund the B.C.A.P. making it very cheap to administer, in comparison to the
expensive and complicated administrations of the colonies of other European powers
such as the French, Belgians and Germans.354
An example of this privatisation of colonialism, favoured by the British administration,
can be seen with the A.L.C., which was formed in 1877 by the Glaswegian
businessmen, John and Frederick Moir. This private mercantile enterprise had links
to the Scottish religious establishment but operated commercially rather than
philanthropically in the British sphere of influence in East-Central Africa. In addition
to its main focus of carrying out trade and transportation of commodities on the lakes
of East-Central Africa, the company acted alongside agents of the B.C.A.P. and
B.S.A.C. in their shared aims of enhancing European influence in Central Africa,
combating the slave trade and assisting the British missions in the region.355 This
allowed the administrators of British Central Africa to simultaneously expand British
influence in the region whilst keeping the costs required to run the protectorate within
the tight budget they had available.
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The sway of Arab-Swahili slave traders presented a most difficult challenge to early
British administrators in the region, who were expected to establish their dominance
over the Arab-Swahili, ending their slave trading for both moral reasons and to limit
the coastal traders economic capabilities, but who did not have the funds,
equipment or manpower to face the traders in open war.356 Therefore, a gradual
policy of removing the Arab-Swahili through economic pressure was adopted, so that
the B.C.A.P. could simultaneously flourish.357 Decle echoed this idea when he stated
that it is not by force that (the slave trade) will be suppressed but by the introduction
of commerce, while Trivier stated that only the British method was truly effective in
ending the slave trade.358
This idea came to define B.C.A.P. policy. Johnston himself was of the opinion that,
The presence of Arabs is incompatible with the introduction of European
civilisation and sooner or later the Arabs must go from Central Africa  It may
be possible to govern them on the East Coast  (but) in the interior of Africa
they are adventurers, and ordinarily adventurers of the worst type.359
Yet Sharpe, Johnstons second-in-command and replacement as commissioner in
1896, was far more cautious, writing repeatedly to Johnston regarding the need to
maintain a peaceful approach to the Arab-Swahili traders.
Are we prepared to control and administer this portion of British Central Africa
without expecting any appreciable amount of revenue for many years to
come? If we are not, then we had better leave it alone at once and for all, and
allow the Arabs to continue their unpleasant work, and have no friction with
them  There is much work to do in controlling the coast men and semi-
Arabs, and re-establishing the idea of security and justice in the country.
Abdullahs power is nothing great in Itabwa, but I do not think we should at the
first openly oppose him. I have no doubt whatever that if a strong government
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station were established in Mweru it would quickly draw a large native
population round it and that such a station would soon be able to control the
Itabwa Arabs without having to resort to any violent measures.360
In Itabwa we (if we do anything at all) must gradually strengthen our position,
and not oppose the Arabs until we are quite able to get the best of them. It
would not take long.361
(The Arabs) had no ill feelings against us at all, as long as we leave them
alone, but if we endeavour to stop their slaving work  and we are not strong
enough to hold our own against them, they will become dangerous; but (if we
do anything in Itabwa) my opinion is that we should not send in any foreign
force, but should gradually collect a strong native population around our
station.362
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Abdullah ibn Suliman came to Mweru-
Tanganyika with Tippu Tip and Kumba Kumba in the 1860s and remained behind as
their deputy there through the 1880s and 1890s, after they retired to the coast.363 By
the time of the founding of the B.C.A.P., Abdullah and his lieutenants, such as
Nsemiwe Kalangula, Meso and Masala, held Mweru-Tanganyika and many of the
surrounding districts in an iron grip. According to Trivier and Sharpe, he ruled from
Lake Mweru, in the west, to Kabunda, near Lake Tanganyika, and was able to
monopolise the ivory trade in the 1890s, effectively replacing the Nsamas of the
Tabwa as sultan of Itabwa.364 Even Mpweto at the northern tip of Lake Mweru
described himself as Abdullahs child.365 Both Crawford and Sharpe blamed
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Abdullah directly for despoiling Itabwa, saying that he followed exactly in the
footsteps of his master, Tippu Tip.366
However, upon meeting the trader, it was largely agreed that he was most helpful to
the Europeans and that he seemed to share the opinion of the B.C.A.P.
administration that war in the region was undesirable for both sides.367 He confirmed
to Trivier that Europeans were in no danger from the Arab-Swahili under his
command, saying that nous ne ferons aucun mal aux blancs  car nous sommes
leurs alliés (we will not do any harm to whites because we are their allies).368 The
French explorer found Abdullah most helpful and an excellent hôte et ami
(excellent host and friend), with the trader promising Trivier: je ferai ce que tu
voudras (I will do whatever you want).369 Even Sharpe called him a pleasant and
hospitable Arab when he passed through in 1890.370
Whilst Abdullah saw the sense in maintaining a peaceful status quo with the British
so as to continue trading legitimate commodities such as ivory for as long as
possible, even asking to be made a semi-autonomous salaried chief for the
administration according to Sharpe, many of his subordinates did not respond to the
British intrusion into their lands quite so peacefully.371 In 1890, there was a brief spell
of peace across Itabwa between Abdullah and Nsama VI Mutuka of the Tabwa,
which seemed particularly encouraging for the British cause.372 However, less than
two years later the Arab-Swahili killed Mutuka after a 90 day siege of his village.373
This sparked off a series of Tabwa-Arab-Swahili skirmishes, despite the British
administration stepping in with a candidate of their own for Nsama, called Mukula,
which was intended to reduce Abdullahs influence in the region and warn him off a
continuation of the violence.374 Mukula signed a treaty with the British in November
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1892, swearing fealty to the Crown in return for its protection against the rampant
Arab-Swahili of Abdullah.375
Two years later in 1894, Abdullahs lieutenant, Nsemiwe, entered Mukulas village
and tore down the British flag given to the chief by the B.C.A.P. administration and
destroyed it. E.J. Glave described the events thus;
Nsemiwe some time ago pulled down the British flag at Mukulas village,
danced on it, and asked Mukula where his friends the British were?
Worringham  sent three messengers to Masala with the idea of opening up
communication with the slavers. Masalas people killed one of the three men,
ill-treated the other two by flogging, then took all their cartridges away, gave
them back their guns, and started them of with insulting and defiant messages
to the white men.376
The local British official, F.C. Worringham, based nearby at Choma was powerless to
stop the coastal traders and their provocative actions.377 In retribution, Masala and
Nsemiwe were then besieged for fifty days by Descamps and Duvivier of the C.F.S.
and Masala was killed as a result, whilst Nsemiwe fled. Glave wrote the most
accurate description of the encounter, having passed through the besieging C.F.S.
forces himself. The Arab-Swahili were besieged by Duvivier and Descamps along
with over 400 C.F.S. soldiers and a single artillery piece. Reinforcements had been
sent for from Verdick but the siege lasted only 10 days, finishing before he arrived. In
total, there were ten C.F.S. casualties and many more among the Arab-Swahili,
Masala included.378 Glave wrote of the siege, It is the last stand of the slavers in this
part of the world. Even with two of his closest supporters effectively at war with the
European colonialists, Abdullah refused to be provocative and come to their aid.379
This event proved Sharpes early assertions that antagonism and war between the
British and Arab-Swahili would only be disastrous for both sides. As it was, the
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British were not strong enough militarily to defend one of their loyal chiefs and lost a
member of their staff as a result, whilst the guilty coastal traders suffered a bad
defeat at the hands of the C.F.S. in retaliation and lost several of their own men. This
was particularly disastrous for the British administration due to the very small number
of officials and collectors actually employed by them in the early 1890s. In fact,
Johnston described this very small staff perfectly when he estimated to Lord
Rosebery that there were no more than 240 white Europeans in the whole of the
British sphere of influence by 1894, the vast majority of whom were English or
Scottish missionaries.380 The joint realisation that conflict had such negative effects
actually served to strengthen British-Arab-Swahili peaceful coexistence for a time,
according to Lary and Wright.381
Abdullah and his el-Murjebi clique compatriots were not the only coastal traders
active in Mweru-Tanganyika during the last decades of the nineteenth-century, with
several independent traders also being present in the region. The most prominent of
these was the Baluchi trader, Kabunda, who operated out of Sumbu at the
southernmost tip of Lake Tanganyika. Kabunda was well-known as a supporter of
the British administration and relied on the transport routes of the A.L.C. to trade due
to his isolated position.382 Sharpe recognised the traders isolation and potential as
an ally to the British, writing of him,
Kabunda will not, I think, ever give  trouble to us. He is getting old and feels
his day for freebooting is over. Moreover he, not being an Arab, is not on good
terms with Tippu Tips people, and he has no allies.383
According to Lary and Wright, Kabunda was the only trader in the region who came
close to threatening the influence of Abdullah and the remaining el-Murjebi clique but
he died in 1894, making his overall impact on the region at the time insubstantial.384
Around 1895, there was a definite shift in the balance of power in Mweru-Tanganyika
with the British finally beginning their ascendency to dominance after decidedly
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mixed success in the first few years of the protectorate. The key to the success of
the B.C.A.P. against the Arab-Swahili during the middle years of the 1890s was the
application of devastating commercial pressure, as suggested by Swann in the early
1890s, which stifled both the trade of the Arab-Swahili and their ability to obtain
firearms and ammunition with which to maintain their dominance of Mweru-
Tanganyika. This successful policy of economic strangulation was only helped by the
downfall of two of the most influential traders left in East-Central Africa, Rumaliza
and Nshimba, and the weakening of Arab-Swahili political control that this brought
with it.
Rumaliza was finally defeated by the C.F.S. in 1894 and begged the British to allow
him to stay in the protectorate. However, they refused and sent him back to Zanzibar
to avoid further violence. Alfred Swann wrote something of an epitaph to Rumalizas
career in East-Central Africa,
He was crushed together with all the vile hordes which for so many years had
struck terror into the hearts of Africans. Civilisation had triumphed.385
The first method of economic control employed by the B.C.A.P. was to stifle Arab-
Swahili slave exports out of Mweru-Tanganyika with strategically placed stations
such as Kalungwishi and Rhodesia, manned by Anglo-Indian and Sikh policemen
from British India, who numbered around 200 by 1893.386 This forced the coastal
traders to rely upon the British markets, at Abercorn for example, to sell their ivory
stocks, with all alternative routes closed to them.387 The British station at Abercorn,
near the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, was very much the linchpin in this
strategy, located as it was near the lake shore, in the corridor between Lakes Nyasa
and Tanganyika, on the main caravan route east towards the coastal markets and on
the border with the German East African colony.388
The Germans and C.F.S. had reduced the avenues of trade for the Arab-Swahili to
such an extent that the British in the south of Tanganyika represented the only
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potential friendly European trading partner in the entire region. Sharpe wrote to
Johnston of this situation and of the importance and success of Abercorn in
pressuring the coastal traders economically and forcing them to rely on the British as
the only outlet for their goods. He called Abercorn one of the most hopeful spots in
British Central Africa and said that it was doing more trade than any of the other
stations in British Central Africa combined by 1893/94. The only reason that Sharpe
could think of as to why the British were not taking the entire ivory trade in the region
through Abercorn was because the Arab-Swahili were worried about transporting
large amounts of ivory south along Lake Tanganyika with its tempestuous waters.389
This policy of economic pressure upon the Arab-Swahili was only one facet of the
British strategy in dealing with the coastal traders in Mweru-Tanganyika. The other
aspect was the control and limitation of the Arab-Swahili importation of firearms and
gunpowder into the interior. Between 1893 and 1895, the Arab-Swahili sought to
import vast amounts of guns and powder into the interior from the coast, in the hope
of arresting their decline in power and continuing the slave trade.390 In 1894, the
British Foreign Minister, Lord Kimberley, banned the private importation of firearms
into the B.C.A.P. and allowed the officials therein to both confiscate and enforce the
payment of duties and fines upon any illicit contraband found, almost exclusively in
Arab-Swahili possession.391 This soon resulted in a great scarcity in powder across
British Central Africa.392
In response, the Arab-Swahili stepped up the movement of large amounts of
gunpowder into the interior, attempting to outrun the British customs patrols.
Rumaliza imported 17 guns and 1500 bullets to fight the C.F.S. in 1893, whilst other
traders such as Teleka, Divani, Mwasamusa, Mabruki and Hasman smuggled
powder into the B.C.A.P. throughout 1894.393 Teleka initially brought 1100lbs of
powder, Mwasamusa another 60 kegs and Hasman, Mabruki and Divani a further 56
kegs and 400 lbs of powder into the region, representing a very real potential threat
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to the British and their operations to break the Arab-Swahili stranglehold on the
land.394
It was quickly realised that the Germans were complicit in this arms dealing and
even actively assisted the Arab-Swahili in moving the powder. Whether this was an
attempt to destabilise the B.C.A.P. or more simply driven by greed, it was estimated
that the Germans directly helped to import at least 110 kegs of powder into the
protectorate.395 Sharpe wrote several letters to Johnston regarding the German
complicity and quite brazenly accused them of it in official government documents.
If only European powers were united for the general good of Africa they would
take measures to prevent any more guns or gunpowder from coming into the
hands of Arabs  Germany has commenced by selling powder very largely to
the Arabs  deliberately furnishing the slave traders with the means of
reviving their struggle against an anti-slave government.396
This betrayal by their erstwhile European compatriots seemed to spur the officials of
the B.C.A.P. into action and they stepped up the collection of duties and
confiscations of Arab-Swahili contraband across the region. Sharpe demanded this
of many coastal-traders in the region in 1894, whilst H.C. Marshall, the British
Judicial Officer stationed at Abercorn, was able to enforce the duties on Teleka to
such an extent that he repeatedly paid the duty he was required to without actually
having it demanded off him by British officials.397 In 1894 alone, Teleka voluntarily
paid 25 kegs of powder as import duty to the British.398
This was realistically the beginning of the end for the Arab-Swahili in the British
sphere. Without their firearms and being forced to rely upon the British for continued
trade, the coastal traders were ripe to be expunged once and for all and the B.C.A.P.
officials took the opportunity. Johnston and Fotheringham began military operations
394
Kerr Cross to Sharpe, 21
st
May 1894, FO2/66, pp. 330-331.
395
Johnston to Sharpe, 26
th
August 1893, FO2/54, p. 367, Johnston to Sharpe, 27
th
December 1893,
FO2/54, p. 400, Sharpe to Johnston, 11
th
June 1894, FO2/66, p. 325 and Sharpe to German Officials, 11
th
June 1894, FO2/66, p. 332.
396
Sharpe to Johnston, List of Measures to Counter Arms Importation into British Central Africa, 19
th
July
1894, FO2/67, pp. 100-101.
397
Sharpe to Hill, 8
th





Marshall to Johnston, 7
th
May 1894, FO2/68, pp.153-154.
112
against the remaining Arab-Swahili, which were continued by Sharpe and his
assistants following Johnstons retirement from Central Africa in 1896.399
British officers, including J.M. Bell, Hector C. Croad, Andrew Law, Robert
Codrington, H.T. Harrington, Robert Young, J. Drysdale, Richard Crawshay, Major
P.W. Forbes and Charles McKinnon, led assaults on the remaining Arab-Swahili
through the second half of the 1890s, killing at least 35 coastal slavers, including
Hamadi and Hashim ibn Hamedi and Nasoro ibn Suliman (Chisesa), freeing over
100 slaves and capturing in excess of 1000lbs of ivory.400
By this point, Abdullah ibn Suliman had fully recognised the British control of the
region and entered the administration as a loyal regional chief so as to remain in his
lands in Mweru-Tanganyika and continue trading, even if on a limited scale. In 1899,
Nasoro ibn Suliman was attacked by B.C.A.P. officials and Abdullah was warned not
to assist his fellow trader. Abdullah went one better and in fact handed over the
troublesome die-hards to the British, ending the Arab-Swahili presence in Mweru-
Tanganyika. However, Harrington grandiosely claimed to be the means of forcing
the last of the Arab slave traders to give himself up in North-Eastern Rhodesia for
his part in this defeat of Nasoro.401
4.2 The Arab-Swahili and the C.F.S.
The C.F.S. was a privately-controlled state owned by King Leopold II of Belgium,
created in 1885 and encompassing much of the area of the present-day Democratic
Republic of Congo. Its territory stretched as far east as the western shoreline of Lake
Tanganyika, south-east to the town of Mpweto on the northern tip of Lake Mweru,
and south into Katanga and the land west of the Luapula River.402 Therefore, it
shared relatively extensive borders with the British sphere of influence in East-
Central Africa and also had a presence in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor during the
last decade of the nineteenth-century.
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As it covered such a huge area of land, the C.F.S. had numerous encounters with
Arab-Swahili traders throughout its territory. However, this section will focus more
precisely upon the interactions between officials of the C.F.S. and coastal traders,
most notably Nshimba of Kilwa Island, in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and its
immediate surroundings.
In comparison to the more measured and peaceful method used by the British
administration to oust the Arab-Swahili from their sphere of influence, the tactics
employed by the C.F.S. were positively vicious and predicated upon the willingness
to use extreme levels of violence against any person or group in the region who they
came into conflict with. This was true of anyone the C.F.S. officers believed guilty of
being involved in the slave trade and, especially, of exporting the natural resources
(ivory included) which the State had claimed as its own.
For many European observers, this method was exactly what was required in East-
Central Africa to combat the Arab-Swahili. Glave and Moloney were both supporters
of these proactive methods and Glave wrote in August 1894 that,
The Belgians are  displaying such zeal in removing the lawless influences in
the land. The Belgian policy is  thoroughly antislavery. Within the last few
years they have done wonders.403
Moloney was the medical officer on Stairs C.F.S. expedition of 1887-1892 and was
certainly of the opinion that slavery had to be forced into extinction through violent
means as opposed to the politico-economic B.C.A.P. method. He wrote,
My own impression is that you cannot abolish an immemorial custom like
slavery by the stroke of the pen  the Arabs hold on Africa is far firmer than
(imagined)  and as he is both ready and willing to fight for his own; the
dislodgement cannot be effected as you flick a caterpillar from a wall.404
However, many also saw the violent methods of the C.F.S. as no better than the
Arab-Swahili and other slave traders they came to remove. For example, Decle
called the C.F.S. and their methods detestable and wrote that their military
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operations were little better than the worst raids of the slave-dealing Arabs.405
Johnston also described their displays of wanton violence with disgust in a letter to
the British Foreign Office.
As often as not the slave trader is a harmless native chief who has not
however given in his allegiance to the Congo Free State  the recent
proceedings of the officers of the Congo Free State  hardly differ in
character from the slave raids which they came to abolish on the part of the
Arab.406
One of the worst practices used by the C.F.S. in the region was the sentry system
of leaving one or two-man posts at African villages as collectors. These sentries
developed into iron-fisted despots with their own little fiefdoms of villages which they
could exploit and abuse for their own gain.407
The C.F.S. first entered the region with expeditions to Msiris Garenganze kingdom
and its capital, Bunkeya, in 1890. According to Moloney, the expeditions aimed to
subjugate Msiri and gain access to Katangas rich mineral deposits, such as copper,
but the first C.F.S. officer at Bunkeya, Lieutenant Paul Le Marinel, claimed the
Belgians to only have peaceful intentions.408 As would soon be seen, the C.F.S.s
peaceful intentions in Katanga would not last long.
Le Marinel, Descamps, Legat and E. Verdick were joined at Bunkeya in October
1890 by another expedition led by Captain Alexandre (Pierre) Delcommune, with
subordinates including Lieutenant Hakansson and Dr Briard. Stairs then arrived with
his subordinates, Captain Omer Bodson, Thomas Robinson, Dr Joseph Moloney and
the Marquis Christian de Bonchamps, and a 350 man expedition in December of the
same year.409 The C.F.S. forces in Garenganze by this point numbered in the high
hundreds and looked more like an occupation force than a group of peaceful
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expeditions. In December 1891, an argument between Msiri and Omer Bodson left
both dead and the kingdom of Garenganze without its founding ruler.410
The C.F.S. soon stepped into the ensuing anarchy, building a fort at Lofoi, to the
north-east of Bunkeya, annexing Katanga and beginning to subdue the region and its
people. Stairs men reportedly looted many villages and killed hundreds of locals,
establishing a reputation for violence in the region that saw whole villages
abandoned before C.F.S. soldiers arrived and also an increase in raiding and
violence that the Belgians could barely contain.411 Legats forces were realistically
unable to keep the peace across the entire region and Crawford declared that
warlordism was on the rise in Katanga. It was also bemoaned that, despite their
obvious failures, the C.F.S. was all that was stopping utter lawlessness.412 They
were already acting particularly viciously towards anyone accused of slaving, killing
all those they found.413
However, September 1893 saw a whole new level of violence perpetrated by the
C.F.S. as the infamous Clément Brasseur arrived in Katanga to aid Verdick and
replace Legat. En route to his post, Brasseur had already scattered a slave caravan
and was set to only continue his violent military operations.414 Brasseur was
renowned for his merciless approach to foreign ivory and slave traders and was
known for pronouncing very harsh sentences upon any he captured, either death or
hard labour. It was not long before he had the whole of Katanga effectively under his
boot heel.415
The Plymouth Brethren missionaries, who had long been established in Garenganze
and then in the Lofoi valley further east, were disgusted by Brasseurs new regime
and Crawford, who witnessed many of the atrocities carried out by the C.F.S. from
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the Lofoi mission, described the situation as worse than he ever saw under Msiri,
with villages desperate for protection only further despoiled by Belgian forces.416
One of the most telling encounters between the mission and the C.F.S. under
Brasseur came in 1895, when a caravan led by Campbell carrying supplies to the
Lofoi mission station was seized by Brasseurs men. The Belgians accused the
African porters in the caravan of slaving, confiscated the goods they carried and
proceeded to sentence all 72 men to hard labour and marched them through the
mission en route to Lake Tanganyika. This was the final straw for the Plymouth
Brethren and they swiftly abandoned the Lofoi valley for their new station at Luanza,
on Lake Mwerus western shore, stating the impossibility of getting on with the
officer in charge as the reason.417
Whilst this description of C.F.S. activities in Katanga during the early 1890s may
seem to have little to do with their relationship with the Arab-Swahili of the Mweru-
Tanganyika, it is important to understand the strategy used by the Belgians to
combat slavery and also to understand the situation in Katanga and with Msiri and
his Yeke, who were inextricably linked to the coastal trader, Nshimba of Kilwa Island,
throughout this period.
Nshimba was originally from Uganda, but was seized as a slave and taken to
Zanzibar where he was Islamised and introduced to the Swahili culture. His early life
was spent as a ruga-ruga leading caravans for his owner back on Zanzibar. He soon
struck out on his own, forming his own armed group and raided and traded,
becoming notorious throughout the entire Mweru-Tanganyika region in the late
1880s.418 Nshimba was soon asked to intervene in a war between the African chief
of Kilwa Island in Lake Mweru, Nkuba, and Msiris Yeke around 1887. When Nkuba
could not pay Nshimba for his mercenary services, as promised, the trader occupied
Kilwa Island, expelled Nkuba and set himself up as chief.419 Nshimba also held
territorial possessions on the shoreline of Lake Mweru at Kawesa, which was famed
for its plentiful ivory and was desired greatly by the Europeans, especially the C.F.S.
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According to Musambachime, this territory was known by peoples of the region as
Nshimbas inchi ya mali or land of wealth.420
The early 1890s, following Msiris death, was the height of Nshimbas strength.421 He
regularly raided the western shore of Lake Mweru with his lieutenant, Senami, and
allied with two other traders, Kafindo and Muruturutu, in preparation for any attack by
Stairs and the C.F.S. Muruturutu was particularly effective in this process of raiding
and demanding tribute from local chiefs and reportedly had over 15 tributaries by
1893.422 Nshimbas raids were so devastating that they even threatened the C.F.S.
fort in the Lofoi valley, despite Legats garrison, and Nshimba took to calling himself
Dimbi-Dimbi, meaning Deceiver, due to these brazen raids.423
However, with the arrival of Brasseur in 1893, the C.F.S. no longer remained on the
back foot, waiting for Nshimba, and locked down the Lofoi valley under strict martial
law.424 Verdick was then sent to lead the first assault on Nshimbas fortress-island of
Kilwa, which failed to achieve much more than killing a few of Nshimbas ruga-ruga
and seizing some of his powder and cloth before it was repulsed.425 This sudden
assault succeeded in surprising Nshimba, as it represented the first attempt by a
European power to militarily dislodge a coastal trader in the whole of Mweru-
Tanganyika.426
A second attack occurred in April of the following year, led personally by Brasseur,
but it failed in much the same way as the first assault.427 In response, Senami
attacked both an A.L.C. caravan near Lake Mweru and opened fire on the Plymouth
Brethren missionary, Law, as he passed up the lakes western shoreline to the
mission station at Luanza.428 A third assault on the island by C.F.S. forces, this time
led by Verdick, Descamps and Duvivier, ended once again in failure with many
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casualties, despite the Belgians possessing a Nordenfeldt organ gun, which fell into
the hands of Nshimbas men.429 In an even worse stroke of luck, not long after the
third attack was repulsed, Duvivier was killed by a hippo whilst boating on Lake
Mweru, losing the C.F.S. a most talented and experienced officer.430
After fighting off three C.F.S. assaults on his fortress, Nshimba seemed all but
invincible to both Europeans and Africans in the region.431 Verdick wanted Crawford
to step in and negotiate a deal between Nshimba and the Belgians. This was
partially successful, with Muruturutu and Kafindo abandoning their alliance with
Nshimba and choosing peace instead, largely based upon the suggestion of
Crawford, who was one of the few Europeans of some reputation and with good
standing amongst the coastal traders.432 With his allies gone, Nshimba seemed
somewhat weakened and Descamps launched a retaliatory attack on Senami for his
earlier raids on the A.L.C. and Plymouth Brethren missionaries. Once again, this
C.F.S. attack failed thanks to the Belgian rifles and Nordenfeldt organ gun captured
previously by Nshimbas men.433
However, in 1895 Nshimba accidentally shot and killed himself, completing the task
the C.F.S. had failed to achieve for over two years and this led to the effective
crumbling of Arab-Swahili power around Lake Mweru.434 A force British force of Blair
Watson, Croad and 21 Sikh policemen quickly swept onto Kilwa Island, soon after
Nshimbas death and claimed it for the British, installing the traders six-year-old son,
Wasswa, as chief, with Nshimbas old lieutenants, Sudi, Senami and Kifula
Mulyapembe assisting him.435
This meant that all of the major coastal traders around the lake were either dead or
had fled elsewhere to escape the wrath of resurgent C.F.S. forces. Muruturutu had
fled to the B.C.A.P. and set himself up as a village chief there, while Kafindo was
presumed dead after being shot by the C.F.S. officer, Demol. However, it soon
429
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turned out that Kafindo had only been wounded by the bullet and had also fled the
area.436 With the region more peaceful than it had been in a decade with all of
Nshimbas old Arab-Swahili and ruga-ruga followers under European control, C.F.S.
involvement with the Arab-Swahili in Mweru-Tanganyika was effectively at an end.437
This section has explored the relationship between the Arab-Swahili in and around
the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor and the European colonial powers penetrating the
interior of East-Central Africa. There is an obvious contrast between the tactics used
by the British and those used by the C.F.S., with the British relying upon economic
sanctions to stifle Arab-Swahili power in the region, whilst the C.F.S. sought to use
full-blown military operations to oust the coastal traders from their sphere of
influence. Generally speaking, the British method was more successful and less
bloody and led to a smoother transition of power for the lands under their control
than those under the C.F.S., whose extremely violent methods actually caused even
greater unrest than had often been seen before their arrival in Katanga and Mweru-
Tanganyika.
By 1900, the Arab-Swahili were largely gone from Mweru-Tanganyika and their long
dominance of the region was well and truly broken. The era of European control had
begun and the only coastal traders remaining in the twentieth century were those
able to negotiate places for themselves in the new colonial dispensations, such as
Abdullah ibn Suliman and Muruturutu. The most famous traders, such as Tippu Tip
and Rumaliza, had retired to Zanzibar and the Swahili coast and slavery was
gradually being eliminated in East-Central Africa as the European colonial powers
established effective governance over their lands.
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Figure 2  A photograph of the C.F.S. officers, Captain Descamps and Lieutenant
Duvivier during the siege of Masala and Nsemiwes camp in 1894. [Glave, E.J.,
Glave in the Heart of Africa: Peace and War between Lakes Bangweolo and
Tanganyika (From the Journals of the Late E.J. Glave), The Century Magazine
(New York, August/September 1894), p. 931]
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Map 3  Sketch-map of the British colonial stations in the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor drawn by Harry Johnston, High Commissioner of the B.CA.P. [Johnston to
the Foreign Office, 25th September 1893, National Archives of the United Kingdom
Kew, FO2/55, p. 67]
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Conclusion
A History of the Arab-Swahili in Mweru-Tanganyika
- A wide-ranging, rough-and-tumble business?
438
The nineteenth-century in the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor was a time of great
economic, social and political change, with the vast majority of these changes being
driven by the involvement of Arab-Swahili traders in the region. From the beginning
of the 1800s, the Arab-Swahili were gradually penetrating ever deeper into the East-
Central African interior from their bases on the continents east coast, with the aim of
gathering ivory, slaves and other commodities to export. The first half of the century
was one of African domination. The coastal traders in the African interior were still
too weak and too few in number to pose any realistic threat to regional authorities of
the region. Trade was limited to certain specific routes and most of the African
political elites were able to maintain their hold on monopolies of goods such as ivory,
making them the only source from which the Arab-Swahili could obtain the
commodities they desired.
This all changed around the middle of the century with the arrival of very large
trading caravans in Mweru-Tanganyika for the first time. The 1860s also saw the
arrival of the el-Murjebi clan of Zanzibari traders, led by the brothers Tippu Tip and
Kumba Kumba. These traders personified a new generation of Arab-Swahili and a
shift in their modus operandi, leaving behind the ideas of minimal involvement in
internal African affairs beyond the needs of trading, and of only resorting to violence
if no other option were available.
Tippu Tip pioneered the use of direct violence or the threat of it as a tool to achieve
his economic aims and, as a result, caravans became heavily armed and larger in
size, whilst traders were far more willing to involve themselves in the internal politics
438
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of the African peoples they were trading with. The new found strength of the Arab-
Swahili caravans allowed them to largely ignore the dictates of paramount chiefs and
to trade wherever and with whomsoever they wished. This change in strategy broke
the power of the African political elites who relied upon traditional networks of tribute
and gift-giving and the loyalty of their vassals. For the first time, chiefs of relatively
minor standing were able to trade directly with the Arab-Swahili and make
themselves wealthy in the process. With the foreign goods they obtained from this
trade, they no longer needed the gifts provided by their overlords and thus were able
to establish powerbases of their own.
However, the African political elites that the Arab-Swahili were depriving of their
vassals and weakening would often not lie down and let their people come to depend
upon intrusive elements, such as the Arab-Swahili, rather than their old paramounts.
It is for this reason that the Arab-Swahili came heavily armed and were able to hold
their own, militarily, against the forces of African polities for the first time. This exact
situation played out in Itabwa in 1867, when the Tabwa paramount, Nsama III Chipili
Chipioka, and Tippu Tip clashed over which leader would economically, and
therefore politically, control the region. The heavily armed coastal traders defeated
the Tabwa and forced Nsama III to flee, occupying his capital and with it the wider
chiefdom of Itabwa.
This was the first time an Arab-Swahili trader had directly involved himself in internal
African politics beyond Lake Tanganyika and it very much set the tone for what was
to follow for the proceeding thirty years. After Nsamas defeat and death, a power
struggle broke out between his successors, and the Arab-Swahili took the
opportunity to play kingmaker in the region, supporting whichever claimant was likely
to prove most advantageous for them. This pattern of Arab-Swahili-backed chiefs
became the norm in many of the polities and chiefdoms in Mweru-Tanganyika, which
effectively consolidated the position of coastal traders as the real power in the land.
This domination continued until the 1890s and the arrival of European colonial
powers in Mweru-Tanganyika. The Europeans were drawn by both the economic
potential of the region and the aim of ending the highly destructive Arab-Swahili
slave trade. Through a combination of military means and economic strangleholds,
the Europeans were able to cut the Arab-Swahilis contact with their east coast
124
bases and markets and stifle the trade that had previously allowed them to dominate
the region. With their main source of income cut off, the coastal traders either
capitulated and folded into the colonial administrations or were defeated and thus
removed from the region. In less than a century the Arab-Swahili had developed
from a position of weak, unsupported individual traders in the African interior,
dependent upon the good will of African political elites, to become the masters of
Mweru-Tanganyika, dominating the land and people politically, economically and
militarily.
Thomas Q. Reefes understated comment regarding the role played by violence in
this rise to prominence and subsequent fall from grace is largely true. The Arab-
Swahili, the long-distance trade and their actions in Mweru-Tanganyika were a
rough-and-tumble business made up of threats, slavery, economic exploitation and
violence.439 However, it was a business and the main focus of the Arab-Swahili
throughout the time they spent in the African interior was profit and the gathering of
wealth.
Even Tippu Tip, who dedicated most of his life to economic and military operations
across East-Central Africa, retired to the coast with his massive wealth and vast
number of slaves once the situation in the interior became unfavourable. For him it
was just business, and whilst business was good, there was no reason to stop
trading and raiding. However, as soon as the Europeans arrived and applied ever-
increasing economic pressure upon the coastal traders, the sensible and wealthy
ones amongst them simply abandoned their mercantile operations and retired to
enjoy their wealth.
This thesis has aimed to explore the history of the Arab-Swahili in the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor of East-Central Africa. It has presented a rough chronology of
the activities of the traders, from their first forays beyond the Swahili coast, to their
eventual expulsion by the European colonialists. It has also examined the economics
of the Arab-Swahili long-distance trade and the commodities that drew the coastal
traders to the interior. The second chapter of this thesis described the effects of the
trade upon the Africans themselves and how they responded to large, well-armed
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caravans of traders and raiders passing through their lands on a relatively regular
basis.
The third chapter of this thesis surveyed the use of violence by the Arab-Swahili, a
defining feature of their time in Mweru-Tanganyika. The responses to the intrusive
traders, in the form of fortifications, were explored as well as the importance of
firearms in the Arab-Swahili rise to dominance.
Finally, the last decades of the Arab-Swahili in Mweru-Tanganyika and their
relationships with the newly arrived European colonial powers were examined. The
two separate and opposing case studies: of Tippu Tips lieutenant Abdullah ibn
Suliman; and of the trader Nshimba of Kilwa Island, highlighted the differing
responses of the traders to the European encroachment on the lands that they had
come to dominate. These examples also reveal the reactions of the Europeans in
dealing with those die-hard traders remaining in the African interior. Abdullah was
able to negotiate the terms of his incorporation into the emerging administrative
structure of the B.S.A.C., whereas Nshimbas story ended in a far bloodier way, as
the trader accidentally killed himself following two years of intense pressure and
repeated assaults upon his fortress-village by C.F.S. forces.
The most important conclusions of this study have been, whilst not ignored, largely
underplayed by historians. The first significant contribution of this thesis has been to
foreground the true importance of the shift in tactics by the Arab-Swahili traders
around the middle of the nineteenth-century: from peaceful trading and a non-
interventionist policy to mercantilism at rifle-point, using violence and direct
involvement in the political affairs of the African peoples of the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor to achieve economic and political domination of the peoples and their lands.
Lary and Wright did unquestionably highlight this shift in their article-length study of
the region. However, they failed fully to address the consequences that such a shift
in policy had upon almost every facet of everyday life in Mweru-Tanganyika. Whilst it
brought the Arab-Swahili into a position of dominance in the region it also had the
effect of weakening the social hierarchies that supported the hegemony of
indigenous political elites. Prior to the arrival of the Arab-Swahili, political power was
based upon social relationships and the loyalty of vassal chiefs and the number of
followers a chief had. To increase their power, these chiefs would monopolise
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commodities, such as ivory, to trade in exchange for imported goods, such as cloth
and beads. These trade goods would then be distributed to win the support of the
people and increase the power of the paramount.
The Arab-Swahili brought about an important change in these vertical patterns of
distribution, as they made it possible for chiefs of decidedly little true influence or
strength to achieve positions of power that would have previously been impossible.
By trading directly with these village chiefs and headmen, they removed the
dependence of these groups upon their old paramount chiefs and therefore
weakened those at the top of the social strata, whilst empowering the low-level
chiefs. The main effect of this was to weaken African political structures in general,
as traditional senior chiefs lost both commercial revenue and the support of their
vassals. This then made it easier for the coastal traders to defeat the paramount
chiefs if they decided to oppose their actions.
The second substantive conclusion of this thesis is that not only did the arrival of the
Arab-Swahili cause great social and political upheaval, but it also brought about new
patterns of behaviour amongst political elites. Following the change in tactics that led
them to involve themselves in the internal politics of those they traded with, the Arab-
Swahili began to play king-maker throughout the region and directly influence the
succession process of many African kingdoms. In the cases of both the Tabwa and
Lunda of Kazembe, the coastal traders were able to support their own favoured
candidates and install them as paramount chiefs. Without their coastal allies, many
of these kings and paramounts had very little true power and this led to the situation
where almost every successive ruler of these polities was installed by the coastal
traders and effectively became their puppet.
Just as the Arab-Swahili were able to support their favoured candidates for
paramount and put them on the throne, they were also able to remove support from
their original candidates or shift their support to others, if the paramounts in question
appeared to no longer favour their interests. Therefore, much of the political history
of the Mweru-Tanganyika Corridor in the second half of the nineteenth-century
consists of succession disputes between rival candidates for the paramountcy, with
one candidate backed by the Arab-Swahili and installed, only for him to lose favour
with his coastal backers and be replaced by a different candidate who now had the
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support of the Arab-Swahili. This represented a shift from the relatively stable
successions of old, where any pretenders to the throne would have lacked the
necessary military strength to effectively oppose the paramount of the polity.
The final conclusion of this thesis is that the decisive factor in allowing the Arab-
Swahili to penetrate, and subsequently dominate, the peoples of the Mweru-
Tanganyika Corridor was internal division and the absence of a strong, centralised
opposition to their political insinuations into the various polities of the region. The
Arab-Swahili were only able to have such an important effect on the political sphere
due to the fact that they were able to exploit both inter- and infra-ethnic divisions. If
the coastal traders had entered a politically united region it would have been far
harder for them to carry out their process of king-making.
One of the best examples of this is the Kisama of the Tabwa, whereby anarchy
reigned in Itabwa following the death of a paramount until the accession of a new
king. This process allowed the Arab-Swahili to legitimately act in an exploitative way,
installing their chosen successor whilst opposing other royal pretenders and, once
installed, they were then thanked for assisting in ending the Kisama and received the
favourable trading partnerships that they always desired. However, the Arab-Swahili
quickly realised that this process was repeatable, as soon as the new paramount no
longer served their interests and a new, more-favourable candidate appeared.
This thesis has sought to provide new insights into the domination of Mweru-
Tanganyika by the Arab-Swahili and to encourage others to explore the events that
took place therein and the factors that allowed them to occur. It is far too easy to
attribute the Arab-Swahili success to their military superiority over the African
peoples and their access to unparalleled amounts of trade goods, such as cloth and
beads. Whilst important, these factors only tell part of the story and this thesis has
endeavoured to show that the hegemony of coastal traders between Mweru and
Tanganyika was also the result of less immediately apparent dynamics.
In conclusion, the history of the Arab-Swahili traders in the Mweru-Tanganyika
Corridor in the nineteenth-century is correctly summarised by T.Q. Reefes jovial
definition of it as a rough-and-tumble business. The Arab-Swahili actions in the
region were defined by their use of violence and exploitation to achieve their
economic and political ends and this continued with the arrival of European
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colonialists in the region. The violence and exploitation continued throughout the
nineteenth-century and arguably only ceased in some areas in the twentieth-century
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